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Abstract 
 
Researchers seeking to understand the adaptive value of sleep have done so, in 
part, by assessing the cognitive effects of sleep on the performance of specific tasks. In 
this study we follow up on previous work reporting that the passage of time affects 
performance on the Transitive Inference (TI) task in subjects trained to below-ceiling 
levels on the premise pairs, and that sleep affected performance in distinctive ways. We 
discuss the possibility that these changes in performance are due to a shift in strategy 
from one in which intermediate premise pairs are coordinated as needed to respond to 
probes, to a strategy which relies on a gradient of preference amongst the stimuli. We 
argue that, in contrast to how previous work on the effect of delay and sleep on the TI 
task has been done, changes in performance should be measured within-subject, by 
testing the same subjects at multiple time points, and present evidence that this approach 
is valid with this task (as opposed to showing any learning effects with repeated testing.) 
We find, on average, no change in performance on this task over the course of 2.5 to 3 
hours, with or without sleep. In contrast to previous work, we find in many subjects high 
levels of performance after only 20 minutes, and a pattern of performance that we 
expected to find only after sleep. We evaluate the use of an innovative technique to assess 
the preference gradient which has not previously been used with human subjects, and 
present evidence that the presence of a preference gradient determines how sleep affects 
changes in performance on this task. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
What is the adaptive value of sleep? It is theorized that by temporarily 
disconnecting the brain from external stimuli and behavior, sleep allows the brain to enter 
an alternate information-processing mode, allowing the brain to re-organize memory in 
ways that result in more adaptive behavior following sleep. Sleep and other neural 
processes occurring during rest periods have been shown to transform memories, 
resulting in measurable changes in behavior over time; but on the other hand, obviously, 
many memory processes do function without sleep. Various tasks have been used to 
assess the effects of sleep on memories encoded before sleep, as reflected in behavior 
after sleep; but exactly how sleep alters memories has not been pinned down.  
Ellenbogen et al. (2007) examined whether sleep had an effect on performance of a 
task which was not previously thought of as sleep-dependent: the transitive inference 
task. In transitive inference, premises are of the form A>B and B>C, where “>” can 
symbolize any transitive relationship; and the probe has the form A?C, a choice between 
items not previously seen before. This is a memory task if subjects memorize the 
premises at an earlier time, and respond to probes at a later time. Although this task has 
been extensively studied in both humans and non-human animals, before Ellenbogen et 
al.’s work, time had not been considered an interesting variable. It was assumed that 
whatever ability an animal had on the task would be apparent whenever the animal had 
learned the premises and was available for another testing session. Surprisingly, however, 
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Ellenbogen et al. reported that although their subjects responded at chance when tested 
almost immediately after the premise-learning session, those tested 12 or 24 hours later 
were significantly above chance in their ability to choose the item consistent with a 
transitive inference.  
Most intriguingly, they reported that performance on certain pairs improved more 
when subjects had slept in the interval between training and test. Specifically, the sleep 
boost was apparent on second degree pairs: probes consisting of pairs of items whose 
relationship can only be determined by performing two inferential steps.1 (A pair’s 
degree of separation depends on the number of intervening items.) The effect of sleep on 
these pairs was replicated by Werchan and Gomez (2013). 
Zeithamova et al. (2012), in trying to explain Ellenbogen’s sleep-dependant results, 
speculate that sleep strengthens the memories for the premise pairs. However, this is not 
consistent with Ellenbogen’s results in a couple of ways. First, if this were the case, we 
would expect to see improved premise pair performance at the later time points, but 
Ellenbogen et al. report identical premise pair performance at all time points (and 
Werchan and Gomez report identical premise pair performance in both the sleep and 
wake conditions). Secondly, why would strengthening the premise pairs benefit second 
degree pairs more than first degree pairs? 
Models of how subjects perform transitive inference provide clues as to what might 
be happening. Various models have been proposed, each of which falls into one of two 
                                                
1 Given B>C, C>D, and D>E, to deduce the relationship between B and E: first infer 
from B>C and C>D that B>D (a first degree inference), and second, infer from B>D and 
D>E that B>E (a second degree inference). Thus BD is an example of a 1° pair, and BE 
is a 2º pair. 
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camps. Coordination models posit that when a novel pairing is presented, the intervening 
premise pairs are (somehow) brought into consideration and combined. Thus, such 
models predict that the more intervening premise pairs are required to link a novel 
pairing, the more computationally expensive and error-prone the novel pairing is to 
resolve. In contrast, linear models, including both quasi-spatial models and preference 
gradient models, claim that items linked by longer chains of premise pairs are represented 
in the brain as more different or widely separated in some way, and thus easier to resolve. 
Thus the two camps of models make opposite predictions regarding which type of 
inference should be performed more accurately, 1º (first degree) pairs or 2º (second 
degree) pairs. Curiously, in both Ellenbogen et al. (2007) and Werchan and Gomez 
(2013), performance on 2º pairs is lower than that on 1º pairs without sleep, consistent 
with a coordination model; but higher with sleep, consistent with linear models—
suggesting that sleep transforms the representation of the premise pairs in the brain to 
support a different, more efficient computational model. Below we review various 
models that have been suggested, and show that a preference gradient model is most 
consistent with the typical pattern of performance on this task observed in both non-
human animals and in humans who are not aware of an expectation that they should use 
transitive inference. We discuss various models of how a preference gradient has been 
proposed to develop over the course of training, and the difficulties these models run into. 
We review some of what is known about how information processing is altered in sleep, 
and relate this to a novel suggestion as to how an off-line process could produce results 
consistent with the use of a preference gradient. We go on to discuss experiments we did 
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to probe the possibility that an off-line process transforms transitive inference 
performance.  
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Chapter II 
Background 
 
History of the Transitive Inference task. Transitive inference is the deduction of 
rankings of non-adjacent members of an ordered series from the ranking of adjacent 
members; i.e., concluding, from A>B and B>C, that A>C. Whether this inference is 
necessarily correct depends on the type of relationship symbolized by >. Every child 
knows that “rock beats scissors and scissors beats paper” does not dictate “rock beats 
paper”. In this case the match-ups are not decided by one orderable property, and 
inferring transitivity would be incorrect. However, when a linear hierarchy does exist, it 
can be extrapolated from the outcome of a small subset of the possible match-ups. Given 
n items, there are n*(n-1)/2 possible pairs; but the n-1 pairs of adjacent items suffice to 
completely determine the entire hierarchy2. Thus, if enough features of the environment 
are intrinsically orderable, the ability to rank alternatives using transitivity has a selective 
advantage. By applying transitive inference, an animal can make the most use of minimal 
learning opportunities. 
The transitive inference (TI) task can be used to probe the neural basis of this 
ability. In a TI task, a set of stimuli is given an arbitrary ordering. (Conventionally in the 
literature on this task each stimulus is referred to by a letter code corresponding with its 
position, with A being the highest-ranked item.) Subjects are exposed to the relative 
ranking within the premise pairs—the pairs of items that are adjacent in the ordering—
                                                
2 For example, if n=10, there would be 10*9/2 = 45 possible pairs, but knowing only the 
(10-1) = 9 adjacent-item pairs would suffice. 
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and then asked to identify the higher-ranked of a novel pairing.  
Originally, this was a completely verbal task, requiring that subjects understand the 
language in which the premises were presented, and either be able to read the language 
themselves, or remember information that was read aloud. In this context, transitive 
inference was viewed as purely a type of logical reasoning carried out by adult human 
beings. Piaget  (cited in Bryant & Trabasso, 1971) used a verbal transitive inference task 
to probe the development of logical abilities in children. Children heard sentences such as 
“Anne is older than Betty. Betty is older than Charlie.” Piaget’s observation that children 
under the age of 7 did not reliably infer that Anne is older than Charlie led him to believe 
that children could not successful perform such a task until they had reached certain 
milestones in the development of their logical reasoning abilities. 
Bryant and Trabasso (1971) revisited the question of whether younger children 
could perform this task, asking whether perhaps children’s apparent inability was due to 
their inability to grasp the abstract verbal presentation of the premises and/or remember 
the information. To ask this, they developed the first version of the TI task in which 
subjects are trained to criteria on the premise pairs. In this type of task, subjects are 
exposed to the premise pairs many times in an initial training phase, and learn through 
trial and error to choose the correct item out of each pair. Testing, in which subjects 
choose between novel pairs of stimuli, occurs only after subjects have demonstrated 
sufficient mastery of the premise pairs. Thus the TI task becomes a memory task. 
Although immediate versions of the transitive inference task3 do involve working 
                                                
3 Immediate versions of the transitive inference task may be verbal tasks, in which 
subjects read or hear the premises, or non-verbal tasks in which the premises are 
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memory, having to learn the premises to criteria requires that the trials leave a more 
durable memory trace. The question becomes, do these more durable memory traces 
support transitive inferences, and if so, how? Correct responses on “anchor” pairs (pairs 
that include either the highest- or lowest-ranked item; see Figure 2.1) may reflect a 
memory of nothing more than the trivial association between these items and “always 
winning” or “always losing” respectively. Thus, Bryant and Trabasso trained children on 
a 5-item series, and regarded their responses to B versus D as the critical test of transitive 
inference. (See Figure 2.1.) 
 
Bryant and Trabasso found that given enough training on the premises, children as 
young as 4 were able to correctly choose B over D. This led to the question of whether 
                                                                                                                                            
available for the subjects to inspect in a graphic form, such as in Wendelken & Bunge 
(2010) and Mackey et al. (2015). 
 
Figure 2.1: Bryant & Trabasso’s (1971) TI experiment. A. Children were taught premise 
pairs such as these. The > symbolizes “longer than” (or another transitive relationship). 
Premise pairs were presented in random order, and the left/right placement of each item 
within each premise pair was randomized. Subjects did not see letter codes associated 
with stimuli. B. The implied hierarchy. Items at the end, in the grey clouds, are the 
“anchor” items; they always win or always lose. Arrows point out a non-anchor pairing 
not included in the training set. C. Example of a test trial. When asked “which one is 
longer?” subjects who are competent at transitive inference reply “green”.  
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non-human animals could also perform a version of this task. After adapting this task for 
use with various other species, researchers have reported competent transitive inference 
performance in studies on apes, monkeys (Merritt & Terrace, 2011), rats (Dusek & 
Eichenbaum, 1997), mice, hooded crows, jays, pigeons (von Fersen, Wynne, & Delius, 
1991), and fish; but not honeybees (Benard & Giurfa, 2004).  
However, is a completely non-verbal version of this task truly the same task, and 
do subjects perform the same cognitive operations? Bryant and Trabasso had children 
choose between non-verbal stimuli (the ends of colored rods), but their verbal 
instructions and feedback encoded a relationship between what the children could see 
(the colors) and a hidden orderable magnitude (the length of the rods). (“Which rod is 
taller, the yellow rod or the green rod?... No, see, the yellow rod is taller.”) In contrast, in 
non-verbal TI tasks, usually the researchers make no attempt to associate the stimuli with 
an orderable property. Implementations of the TI task used with animals usually depend 
on an operant conditioning procedure to imply relationships of the form “X>Y” by 
rewarding the selection of stimulus X when both X and Y are presented. For example, a 
rat learns that when presented with two small cups of sand, one scented with cumin and 
one scented with cocoa, digging in the cup scented with cumin (but not the one scented 
with cocoa) reveals half a Froot Loop (Van Elzakker, O'Reilly, & Rudy, 2003). As 
pointed out in Lazareva et al. (2004), unlike the relationship “is taller than…”, the 
relationship “is rewarded, when presented with…” is not intrinsically transitive.4 Thus, 
finding that an animal responds “correctly” on the transitive inference task, rather than 
                                                
4 Some attempts have been made in animal studies to associate stimuli with an orderable 
property, as in (Lazareva et al., 2004) and (Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006); evidence on 
whether this has an effect on behavior in non-human animals is mixed. 
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indicating any competence at logical operations, may merely indicate that the animal has 
developed preferences amongst the stimuli as a result of the operant conditioning 
procedure, and these preferences are transitive (Lazareva et al., 2004), a process some 
have dismissively referred to as “pseudoinference” (Leo & Greene, 2008).  
The observation that non-verbal animals can perform a task that was previously 
thought of as a type of logical reasoning has inspired researchers to question how much 
of what appears to be logical reasoning in adult human subjects might in fact be based on 
phylogenetically older, non-verbal mechanisms. Higa and Staddon (1993) argued that  
…we have an obligation… to show how the complex 
symbolic abilities of human beings are built upon 
rudimentary ancestors. One way to do this is to study the 
conditions under which behavior that in humans would be 
symbolic can be brought about, by nonverbal means, in 
other animals. 
 Even when human subjects report using an explicit reasoning strategy, they may 
be using a nonverbal strategy that they are not aware of, as people often do not accurately 
report their actual decision-making processes; for example, in experiments in which 
subjects make a decision based on subliminally presented stimuli, subjects may 
confabulate reasoning processes to explain their decision post hoc. Thus, an elucidation 
of how non-human animals perform a task may shed light on the processes involved in 
human performance of an analogous task and vice versa. Much of the recent research on 
TI has sought to make the human and non-human versions of the task as analogous as 
possible in order to test models’ predictions of behavioral results across many species. 
For example, Frank et al. (2005) replicated results of their rat study in undergraduates, 
and argued that the results supported their model (Frank, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2003) as an 
account of the behavior of both groups; and Merritt and Terrace (2011) ran parallel series 
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of variants of the TI task with both rhesus monkeys and humans to test whether the same 
strategies are used in both species.  
Models of Transitive Inference performance. Research into the Transitive Inference 
task has sought to address two questions. 1) How can we build a model of the algorithm 
in the animal’s brain that supports the observed performance on this task? 2) What is the 
neural substrate of the implementation of this algorithm? Models or theories of Transitive 
Inference performance fall into three categories: coordination models, quasi-spatial 
models, and preference gradient models.  
Coordination models posit that when the subject is faced with a novel pairing, the 
memories of the intervening premise pairs are activated, brought into consideration, and 
somehow combined. For example, when faced with B vs. D, one remembers that B beats 
C, and that C beats D. Logical reasoning is a coordination model: it involves explicit 
combination of the premises. Logical reasoning is under top-down, executive control (a 
function of the pre-frontal cortex in the human brain), operating on declarative 
knowledge. The acquisition of declarative knowledge depends on the hippocampus and 
other structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), although the retrieval of declarative 
memories becomes independent of the MTL over time. Reasoning can be deployed in a 
flexible way, thanks to the executive control. Patients with frontal lesions perform poorly 
on tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, a test requiring that the patient flexibly 
choose between and apply different rules for sorting cards. Top-down executive control 
chooses what logical rules to apply, transfers rules from one domain to another, and 
changes how the computation is applied depending on the question at hand. For example, 
a child in Bryant and Trabasso’s study who had mastered knowing that the yellow rod 
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was taller than the green rod, when asked “which rod is shorter,” would respond “green”. 
The capacity to flexibly manipulate declarative knowledge may have evolved due to the 
hippocampus’s original core role in encoding spatial information, which must be flexibly 
re-combined to find novel routes. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
have shown both frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe activation in humans doing the TI 
task (Acuna, Eliassen, Donoghue, & Sanes, 2002; Solomon et al., 2015; Wendelken & 
Bunge, 2010).5 Studies in animals have shown activation of the prefrontal cortex (pFC) 
(Brunamonti et al., 2016)—the cortex covering the front of the frontal lobe—and 
homologous structures (DeVito, Lykken, Kanter, & Eichenbaum, 2010) during TI as 
well. 
The capacity of other species to reason in the same way as humans seems 
questionable, but a coordination model does not necessarily entail logical reasoning. 
Kumaran and McClelland (2012) propose a simple neural net, named REMERGE, which 
performs TI through coordination of the premise pairs. The REMERGE model has 3 
layers of units: an input, or feature, layer; a conjunctive layer, whose units are meant to 
represent the “hippocampal” distinct, orthogonalized representations of individual facts 
or episodes; and a response layer. (See Figure 2.2.) During training, bi-directional 
connections between the feature layer and the conjunctive layer are strengthened, causing 
each episode and its component features to activate each other. Connections from each 
episode to its correct and incorrect response become more excitatory and inhibitory 
respectively. When the model is presented with a novel pairing—for example, when B 
                                                
5 Wendelken and Bunge (2010) did an immediate version of the TI task, and found 
hippocampal involvement not for performing transitive inference per se, but for encoding 
the relationships amongst the stimuli. 
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and D are activated in the input layer—all conjunctive units with either of these features 
(AB, BC, CD, and DE) are initially activated. The combined activation of BC and CD 
causes input unit C to activate, which in turn favors the activation of BC and CD over AB 
and DE. As BC will excite B, and CD will inhibit D, this causes greater activation of B 
than D in the response layer. Similarly, the model can also solve B vs. E; however, since 
the activation has to spread over more intermediate units, the network takes longer to 
settle into its stable pattern of activity, and the difference in activation between B and E 
in the response layer is smaller. (See Figure 2.3.)  
Predictions of a coordination model oppose what is observed in most experimental 
data regarding the relative difficulty of pairs depending on their degree of separation. In a 
coordination model, a 2° pairing is more difficult to solve than a 1° pairing, because more 
 
Figure 2.2: Kumuran & McClelland’s REMERGE. A neural net model which displays 
competence at TI via re-activation and coordination of premise pairs at testing. An 
example of a coordination model which does not use explicit logic rules. Solid grey 
arrows are excitatory connections; dashed black arrows are inhibitory connections; dotted 
grey arrows are bi-directional excitatory connections; and the thick grey curved arrow 
indicates recurrent inhibitory connections within the conjunctive layer. From Kumaran & 
McClelland (2012). 
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premise pairs have to be activated and considered, and more steps are required in the 
processing. In contrast, consider the relative difficulty of answering these two questions: 
“which is further west—Nevada or Colorado?” versus “which is further west—Nevada or 
Kentucky?” In a spatial model, a larger disparity is more easily resolved. In most 
experimental data on the TI task a "symbolic distance effect" is apparent—pairs of items 
further apart are solved with more accuracy than pairs of items closer together.  
Quasi-spatial linear models: Whereas in coordination models, the premises are not 
coordinated until retrieval, quasi-spatial linear models posit that the subject forms some 
kind of linear data structure in memory at the time of encoding (or at least prior to 
testing), integrating each stimulus into its relative position in the hierarchy. When 
subjects are faced with a novel pairing, they then simply look up the relative positions of 
the stimuli in the hierarchy. Some (Gazes, Lazareva, Bergene, & Hampton, 2014; Jacobs, 
2006; Merritt & Terrace, 2011) speculate that the hippocampus's innate spatial abilities 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Response layer activations in the REMERGE model, when the model is 
presented with B vs. D (left) or B vs. E (right). Notice the differing axes: the model 
activates item B more strongly when paired with D (a 1º separation) than when 
paired with E (a 2º separation). From Kumaran & McClelland (2012).  
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have been co-opted to manipulate data in a different domain in an analogous way. This 
implies, however, that mapping arbitrary quantities to a spatial arrangement is innate. If 
this is true, it is surprising that this practice was not common in mathematics until the 17th 
century. When John Wallis (1616-1703) extended the number line into the negative 
direction, and when Rene Descartes (1595-1650) placed two number lines perpendicular 
to each other to represent pairs of numbers, these innovations were not immediately seen 
as natural, but as revolutionary and even controversial. This suggests that perhaps the 
mapping of arbitrary quantities to lines is not innate, nor intrinsically obvious and 
automatic, but only seems natural to highly educated human beings who have been 
presented with this way of representing quantities since grade school. Human minds 
readily take to the idea of making an analogy between relative quantities and a linear 
arrangement in space; but there are many examples of equivalences so embedded in our 
thinking (such as “argument” is “battle”, “communication” is “shipment of goods”, etc.) 
that we do not even recognize when we are using metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
This is probably a uniquely human particularity, a by-product of our use of language. Of 
course, it is highly educated humans, well versed in the conventions of modern, post-
Descartes mathematics, who are positing formation of mental number lines in the brains 
of animals doing the TI task.  
A quasi-spatial arrangement is not the only data structure that could produce 
transitive performance with symbolic distance effects. A quasi-spatial model is analogous 
to, in computer science terms, an array: in a digital computer, pointers to each stimulus 
would be laid out in adjacent memory locations, in the same order as in the actual 
hierarchy. This is not the only way the ordering could be stored. If a hash table is used, 
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pointers to the stimuli are laid out in an arbitrary order; but associated with each of these 
is a number. These numbers encode the order of the hierarchy, if their rank orders 
correspond to the positions of the associated stimuli. (Of course, the architecture of a 
digital computer is utterly different from that of a nervous system, so this is merely a 
high-level analogy, to demonstrate the algorithmic feasibility of each arrangement.) 
Preference gradient models posit that each stimulus becomes associated with a 
“value” or “excitatory strength”, and that the gradient of these values down the hierarchy, 
from best to worst, is an artifact of the operant conditioning procedure used to train the 
subject. Conditioning is a type of memory that is more slowly acquired than declarative 
memory, and influences behavior in a less flexible way. The neural substrate of reward-
conditioned behavior is domaminergic corticostriatal circuitry involving the basal 
ganglia. Dopaminergic neurons in the striatum fire when a reward (either intrinsic, such 
as juice, or extrinsic, such as money) exceeds expectations, thus updating the reward 
contingencies encoded in the corticostriatal loops. As this mechanism associates a 
stimulus with a reward, approach behavior towards the stimulus increases. The 
hippocampus is involved in the reward circuitry as well; learning by the hippocampus 
may be dopaminergically modulated, and the hippocampus mediates the association 
between reward and context. (For a general review of reward-related learning as it 
impacts decision-making, see Delgado & Dickerson (2012).) 
Experiencing rewards during the TI training procedure undoubtedly engages an 
animal’s reward-processing circuitry when the reward is as salient as half a Froot Loop 
must be to a rat. However, competent performance on the TI task requires a more 
complex calculation than simply “approach the more-rewarded stimulus.” In most 
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versions of the task, during training, the subject experiences exactly the same number of 
trials in which B yields a reward (BC trials) and trials in which it doesn’t (AB trials); and 
likewise for the number of DE vs. CD trials. Thus the expected values of stimuli B and D 
are equal, both having a 50% chance of reward (assuming a 5-item or longer series). 
Various models have been proposed to try to explain the observed behavior on the 
TI task as a function of reward history. One of the earliest, and most prominent, models 
to try to explain TI performance based on reinforcement history is the Value Transfer 
Theory (von Fersen et al., 1991). This theory posits that the effective value of each 
stimulus is the sum of the reward value of the stimulus and some function of the effective 
value of the other stimuli with which it was presented.6 Since B is sometimes presented 
with A, its effective value is a function of the reward value of A; and since that is higher 
than the reward value of any other stimulus, the effective value of B is inflated compared 
to other stimuli down the line; B, in turn, inflates the value of C, and so on. Thus a 
gradient of value develops from the transfer of value down the hierarchy. The differences 
in values assigned to stimuli by this theory was observed to match the accuracy of 
pigeons, trained on a 5-item series, in choosing the higher-ranked item in a novel pairing 
(von Fersen et al., 1991); and also predicts that the value curve is steeper at the ends, and 
thus the observed serial position effect (SPE). The SPE is the typical U-shaped curve in 
performance on the premise pairs, with better performance on premise pairs at the ends 
                                                
6 Based on consideration of asymmetries in premise pair performance, von Fersen et al. 
concluded that value transfers only from more-valued stimuli to less-valued stimuli, and 
thus only in one direction along the hierarchy. However, in species other than pigeons, 
the asymmetries amongst premise pairs are sometimes different. Must the mechanisms of 
reward-based learning be different in different species, such that value transfer is 
observed in all species, but in different directions? This seems to be a weakness of the 
Value Transfer Theory.  
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than those in the middle (Figure 2.4).  
Vasconcelos (2008) has pointed out, 
however, that the Value Transfer Theory does 
not model a process. It predicts, 
mathematically, the relationship between the 
valuations of the different stimuli at the end of 
training, but does not predict how these 
valuations update on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Since the pigeon experiences training trial by 
trial, learning over the course of each trial, 
rather than having summary statistics uploaded into its brain all at once, this is a huge 
hole in the theory. Furthermore, the form of the theory that matches the pigeon data—in 
which value transfers just from the higher-ranked item to the lower-ranked item in any 
premise pair—predicts that we would see extremely poor performance on the CE novel 
pairing in a six-item series. Data from pigeons (Daniels, Laude, & Zentall, 2014), rats 
(Van Elzakker et al., 2003), and unaware humans (Frank et al., 2005) trained on six-item 
series have shown, if anything, better performance on CE than on BD.  
More sophisticated algorithmic and neural models of TI performance in animals 
have generally included both elemental and conjunctive encodings of the stimuli. An 
elemental encoding updates the value of each stimulus individually, whereas conjunctive 
encoding updates the value of each stimulus in the context of both stimuli appearing 
together; i.e., after presentation of a B vs. C trial, how much does the brain update its 
representation of B itself, versus its representation of how to respond to B given the 
 
Figure 2.4: The serial position effect, 
the typical U-shaped curve in premise 
pair performance as a function of 
hierarchy position. From Vasconcelos 
(2008). 
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combination of B and C together? Neither type of encoding alone can explain animals’ 
observed performance on this task. An animal attending only to the elemental value of 
the stimuli would fail to learn the premises. The selection of B is rewarded and not 
rewarded equally frequently, and the same could be said for stimulus C. Thus, 
disregarding context leaves the animal with no basis for choosing B over C. On the other 
hand, an animal who only learned conjunctive representations of the stimuli would not be 
expected to respond transitively to novel pairings: a BD trial is a novel context, so 
without any representation of the stimuli independent of context, there is no basis for 
choosing between B and D. 
Various models differ in how these two types of representation work together to 
support observed performance. In the eta-kappa model developed by Delius and Siemann 
(1998), each trial updates both V(X) (the elemental value of stimulus X) and V(X | XY) 
(the value of X in the context XY). Performance on premise pair trials is explained by 
some combination of the elemental and conjunctive value of the stimuli. Some species, 
such as humans, rely more on conjunctive encoding for premise pairs, and are thus able 
to learn the premise pairs of a circular structure (such as rock-paper-scissors), whereas 
others, such as pigeons, seem to be less able to rely on conjunctive encodings, and have 
great difficulty learning a circular set of premise pairs. In either case, transitive inference 
develops due to the relative elemental value of the stimuli.  
The hippocampus, particularly the dentate gyrus, is exceptionally well suited to the 
formation of conjunctive representations due to its sparse representations of input 
patterns, resulting in distinct, separate encodings of patterns with overlapping features. 
This results in the preservation of idiosyncratic features, at the expense of finding 
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generalities. In contrast, non-hippocampal cortex finds regularities in the environment by 
overlapping its representations of patterns with common features; i.e., every time cortex 
encounters an input pattern containing the feature “isa-bird”, synaptic weights related to a 
single “isa-bird” representation are updated, whereas the hippocampus will represent 
“sparrow isa-bird” and “penguin isa-bird” in entirely disjoint patterns of activation. 
According to Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory (McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995), this feature of the hippocampus is important for 
circumventing a key drawback of the cortex’s unified representation. The cortex, on its 
own, cannot quickly find an accommodation of an anomalous pattern; i.e., quickly 
updating the network to learn that a penguin is a bird and that it swims and does not fly 
wrecks the network’s prior understanding that birds fly. The only way the cortex can 
accommodate the “penguin” and “sparrow” patterns, given a unified “isa-bird” unit, is to 
gradually explore representation-space to find a distinct place for the penguin concept. 
This requires gradual learning through many presentations of the “penguin” pattern, 
interleaved with continued repetitions of the other “bird” patterns. However, the 
environment is not so kind as to provide just the right training schedule: animals must 
often quickly learn an anomalous fact given one learning opportunity. The CLS theory’s 
solution to this is to have the hippocampus as a temporary holding pen for idiosyncratic 
memories, which are then gradually replayed back to the cortex over time so that the 
cortex can find a generalized representation that accommodates all exemplars. This 
special role for the hippocampus may offer clues to why the hippocampus is required for 
normal TI performance. Analogous to the hippocampus’s role in keeping seemingly 
contradictory facts such as “most birds fly” and “penguins do not fly” distinct until the 
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cortex finds a way to reconcile their representations, perhaps it also keeps “D loses when 
paired with C” and “D wins when paired with E” distinct until these facts can be 
incorporated into an overall representation.  
A common feature of almost all prior work on the TI task is that it has not 
considered the possibility that the memory traces may change over time, after the 
learning experiences, producing improvements in performance. In almost all studies 
involving human subjects, testing on the non-trained pairs immediately follows training. 
Failure to respond correctly on the non-adjacent pairings in an immediate test is taken as 
indicating that whatever learning the subjects achieved was not sufficient to support 
successful performance on the transitive portion of the task, period. In animal studies, 
because of the more extensive training required for less encephalized animals to reach 
criterion on the premise pairs, training commonly takes place over the course of many 
days; however, time elapsed between training and testing has not generally been 
considered an interesting independent variable in these studies. 
Sleep and memory: This is in spite of the growing realization that off-line time 
between experience and performance, and brain state during that time, are key factors in 
many types of memory. Although in common usage, the word “memory” refers to the 
conscious experience of either mentally re-living prior events or recalling factual 
material, memory researchers define memory much more broadly as “the effects of 
experience that are manifest at a later time.” (Gallagher, 1990) Thus it encompasses not 
just the human experiences of mental time travel—episodic memory—and the ability to 
regurgitate facts—semantic memory—but also procedural memory, Pavlovian 
conditioning, priming effects, conditioned taste aversion, etc., all the way down to gill 
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sensitization in sea slugs, all of which may be encoded in different ways by the nervous 
system.  
Given the diverse roles different types of memory have in enhancing an animal’s 
chances of survival, various types of memories have different requirements for how they 
should be transformed over time. We tend to think of the optimal effect that time should 
have on memory as “preserve it as exactly as possible as long as possible.” After all, our 
most conscious experience of grappling with our own memory is the experience of trying 
to recall the contents of a textbook at exam time as well as when we were staring at the 
pages. However, this is as naïve and over-simplified as thinking of “memory” as just 
“conscious recall of events or facts”. Facts and events do need to be recalled veridically 
sometimes, but they may be more useful when compared and combined to discover 
generalizations; distinct instances of events of the same type need to be combined to 
discover schemas, without losing the distinct details of each event; detail may be lost in 
favor of gist; motor skills improve through becoming more automatic. Emotional tone 
may be useful to tag memories for enhanced encoding, but once the life lessons of a 
trauma have been extracted, it is best that the emotional color fades. As many have 
pointed out (Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2009), the adaptive significance of memory is not to 
capture the past per se, but to optimize future behavior. 
Given the diverse requirements for how different types of memory should evolve, 
and the diverse neural mechanisms underlying their evolution, it is not surprising that 
findings on the effects of time and brain state on memory have been diverse. The earliest 
findings on the effect of sleep on memory by Jenkins & Dallenbach (1924) was on the 
verbal declarative memory of strings of nonsense syllables. They found that the decay in 
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memory over time occurred at a slower rate during sleep. More interesting 
transformations of memory over time are possible when the information is meaningful. 
Later work has found that emotional or meaningful information does not just decay, but 
may be transformed to extract the gist (McKeon, Pace-Schott, & Spencer, 2012) or most 
salient features (Payne, Stickgold, Swanberg, & Kensinger, 2008). Procedural memory—
both motor (Walker, Brakefield, Morgan, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2002) and perceptual 
memory (Stickgold, Whidbee, Schirmer, Patel, & Hobson, 2000)—may actually improve 
over off-line time, especially with sleep.  
Over the past several years, dozens of labs have sought to define exactly which 
memory processes are benefited by sleep (Conte & Ficca, 2013). Whether or not, and 
how, a memory is transformed by sleep may depend not only on its type (i.e. declarative 
vs. procedural), but also on subtle differences in a subject’s learning experience. These 
include whether or not subjects are explicitly aware of what they are learning; for 
example, sleep is required to enhance performance on the Serial Reaction Time Task only 
when subjects are aware of the repeating pattern of button presses (Robertson, Pascual-
Leone, & Press, 2004). Another factor is whether subjects have extensive experience in a 
domain: while most human subjects show a boost only after sleep in performance on the 
motor sequence task, experienced musicians show improvements after a 12-hour delay 
regardless of whether they slept (Tucker, Nguyen, & Stickgold, 2016). Also relevant is 
the difficulty of the task: for example, sleep enhances performance on a repeated 
presentation of remote associates puzzles, but only for the more difficult items (Sio, 
Monaghan, & Ormerod, 2012).  
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To what extent the survival value of sleep has to do with its role in off-line 
information processing is unknown. Clearly sleep must have survival value; it is 
evolutionarily conserved, being found in some form in all animals with brains; 
furthermore, robust mechanisms have evolved to homeostatically regulate both the 
amount of time animals are asleep and the spectral power of brain activity in frequency 
bands characteristic of deep sleep. The arguments that sleep serves the trivial purpose of 
keeping animals immobilized for energy conservation or to avoid predation fail to take 
into account the fact that energy intake or expenditure has very little effect on sleep need, 
and that animals for whom avoiding predation is difficult during sleep still sleep. Even 
marine mammals who must swim continuously to avoid drowning have evolved a way to 
sleep: the two hemispheres of their brains take turns napping (Mukhametov, Supin, & 
Polyakova, 1977). 
Exciting new research has shown that sleep may serve the important physiological 
purpose of clearing out misfolded proteins and other cellular debris in the brain (Xie et 
al., 2013). However, sleep has several distinctive electrophysiological features whose role 
in such a process seems hard to imagine, but which, on the other hand, do seem to have 
something to do with information processing. Spindles, bursts of 12 to 15 Hz EEG 
activity lasting 1 to 1.5 seconds, a defining feature of stage 2 and deeper non-REM sleep, 
have been linked to both synaptic plasticity and coordinated hippocampal replay of 
learning experiences (Marshall & Born, 2007). Localized spindle density has been found 
to be correlated with several types of learning, such as the motor sequence task (Nishida 
& Walker, 2007) and visual perceptual learning (Bang, Khalilzadeh, Hamalainen, 
Watanabe, & Sasaki, 2014).  
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Replay of spatial paths, the firing of sequences of cells coding for spatial locations 
in the order in which they were visited while traversing a maze, has been observed in the 
rat hippocampus during sharp wave ripples, which occur during slow wave sleep (SWS) 
as well as in awake rest states. Gupta et al. (2010) found, in a more complex 
environment, replay of sequences of spatial locations corresponding to paths that the rat 
had never taken. Some of these sequences were backwards replay of routes the rat had 
taken, while others were novel routes formed by re-combining portions of previously 
experienced paths. They theorize that by, in effect, simulating alternate routes, this re-
combination allows the rat to learn a complete map of the environment. Here we have 
electrophysiological evidence that off-line rest periods, specifically those which contain 
sharp wave ripples, allow the brain to explore combinations of elements not actually 
experienced before. Gupta et al. only monitored this hippocampal activity during awake 
rest states, but given the finding of sleep-dependent improvements in navigating a maze 
(Nguyen, Tucker, Stickgold, & Wamsley, 2013) it seems likely that this re-combination 
process is even more productive in sharp wave ripples during sleep.  
Conjoining different memories allows an animal to discover new routes in a 
spatial paradigm, and also allows an animal to come to correct conclusions in an 
inference paradigm. Associative inference is a similar task to transitive inference, 
requiring the subject to conclude from “A goes with B” and “B goes with C” that “A goes 
with C”. There is evidence for off-line processing supporting an associate inference task: 
Schlichting and Preston (2015) report evidence of increased communication between the 
hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex following the learning of associations that 
overlap with previously learned associations, and that this increased communication 
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correlates with subsequently improved associative inference, suggesting that a prefrontal-
hippocampal dialog during rest periods plays a role in integrating memories. 
The most anomalous feature of sleep in terms of neural activity, found in 
homeotherms (mammals and birds), is rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. This stage of 
sleep is also known as “paradoxical sleep”, because the brain is as active in REM as 
during wake, and the EEG is similar. Although normally REM can only be entered from 
other stages of sleep, to some extent REM is controlled independently of other stages of 
sleep: REM propensity is highest at a different circadian phase than is the pressure for 
deep sleep, and the amount of REM sleep within sleep is under some homeostatic control, 
as suppression of REM will result in a rebound in REM intensity later. This suggests that 
REM has functions that are distinct from those served by other stages of sleep.  
Boyce et al. (2016) have experimentally demonstrated a role for REM sleep in 
hippocampally-dependent memory. In mice, hippocampal theta rhythms during REM 
sleep were blocked through optogenetic silencing of GABAergic neurons in the medial 
septum for 4 hours after learning sessions. Unlike control mice, the REM theta-blocked 
mice showed no preference for exploring an object whose location had changed, 
compared to an unmoved object; and showed reduced freezing behavior when placed in 
an environment in which they had received a shock (but normal freezing behavior in 
response to a tone that had been paired with a shock). Thus, some process in the mouse’s 
hippocampus, crucial for later expression of hippocampally dependent memories, occurs 
during REM sleep and is driven by theta oscillations. 
A tantalizing hint that REM may be the brain’s chance to process information in 
some completely different way than in wake is what we often recall when awoken from 
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REM: dreams which are more vivid, bizarre, and narrative than from other stages of 
sleep. Much of the bizarreness of REM dreams comes from the incongruent re-
combination of narrative elements (people, places, things, and motivations): Santa Claus 
in the bathroom, neon lights over the high school lockers, and Dr. Stickgold moving to 
Peru to direct a lab that runs a radio station are typical examples of dream incongruities. 
Thus, phenomenologically, there is evidence for memory recombination during REM.  
Intriguing experimental evidence that the human brain processes information in 
REM in a distinctive way includes the finding that when subjects are awakened from 
REM sleep, and tested immediately after awakening while the brain’s neuromodulatory 
state is still similar to REM, the priming effect of weakly associated words is 
paradoxically stronger than those of strongly associated words (Stickgold, Scott, 
Rittenhouse, & Hobson, 1999). Creativity has been found to be enhanced by REM (Cai, 
Mednick, Harrison, Kanady, & Mednick, 2009). Could it be that one of the purposes of 
REM sleep, as suggested by Walker and Stickgold, is to support the “integrative stage of 
memory processing” (Walker & Stickgold, 2010), allowing the brain to develop 
responses that require the coordinated consideration of multiple experiences? Consistent 
with this theory, improvement on a probabilistic categorization task—which requires 
observing many trials to absorb the probabilistic associations between stimuli and 
outcome—has been found to correlate with REM sleep (Barsky, Tucker, & Stickgold, 
2015). This predicts that REM would benefit a task requiring more integrative than 
veridical recall of the training, such as the Transitive Inference task. 
A proposed off-line process supporting TI performance. I propose that there is an 
off-line process that runs during rest or sleep which processes memories of the form “A 
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was rewarded over B”. In this hypothesized offline process, the brain reactivates 
memories of stimuli, but not necessarily paired up in the pairs encountered during 
training; rather (given the brain’s tendency to recombine memories during sleep) random 
selections of stimuli are recalled. A coordination process determines which stimulus is 
more favored out of the imagined pairing. Thus, in rumination, the animal may encounter 
any of the possible pairings: AB, AC, AD, etc... BC, BD, BE, etc... DE, DF, and EF. Out 
of all possible pairings, in a 6-item TI task, A will win 100% of the time, B 80%, C 60%, 
and so on, based on chaining together the intermediate premise pairs. Thus, if this off-line 
simulation is run enough, the animal "experiences", in its ruminations, a gradation of 
expected value from highest to lowest across the hierarchy. As long as the expected value 
always decreases across the hierarchy, transitive performance is predicted (because E(B) 
> E(D)) and with a symbolic distance effect (because E(B)-E(E) > E(B)-E(D)).  
Prior work on the effect of sleep on the TI task: Although they did not have any 
proposal such as the one outlined above for why this would occur, Ellenbogen et al. 
(2007) hypothesized that the memory-processing role of sleep would enhance or alter 
performance on the Transitive Inference task. Their subjects received minimal training on 
the premise pairs of a six-item sequence. They were then tested either after 20 minutes, 
12 hours awake, 12 hours including a night of sleep, or 24 hours. After 20 minutes, 
subjects were entirely incapable of transitive performance, responding on average at 
chance level on all inference pairs. After 12 or 24 hours, however, the ability to make 
transitive inferences had developed; subjects responded significantly better than chance 
on all inference pairs. Intriguingly, the ability to answer correctly on pairs separated by 
two intervening items (second degree (2°) pair B-E) improved more in subjects who slept 
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during the interval between training and test—more than for 1º pairs and more than 
subjects who were awake between training and test—suggesting a sleep-dependent shift 
away from having to coordinate premise pairs at 
retrieval, towards the development of a 
preference gradient. (See Figure 2.5.) This effect 
of sleep on the 2º pairs was replicated, using a 
nearly identical version of the task, by Werchan 
and Gomez (2013). 
Neither Ellenbogen et al. nor Werchan and 
Gomez measured the sleep parameters of their 
subjects using polysomnography. Other tasks 
have shown correlation between improvement 
and time in specific sleep stages (Stickgold et al., 2000) or electrophysiological 
characteristics of sleep (Nishida & Walker, 2007); these findings guide attempts to 
understand what the brain does with memories during sleep. When sleep stage correlation 
studies can be done using midday naps, more subjects can be run for the same amount of 
resources, increasing the power of these studies; and a nap avoids the question of 
circadian confounds. Naps tend to be very diverse in their sleep stage composition. 
Greater variance in the amount of each sleep stage experienced by each subject enhances 
a study’s ability to detect sleep stage/performance correlations. Nonetheless, some studies 
report a sleep vs. wake effect on performance, without identifying any significant specific 
sleep stage correlation (Nguyen et al., 2013). For this reason, in the study described 
below, we compared the performance of subjects who took a PSG-monitored nap with 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Post-sleep TI 
performance. (Ellenbogen, Hu, 
Payne, Titone, & Walker, 2007) 
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subjects who were awake for a similar length of time. Ellenbogen et al. reported a change 
in TI performance between 20 minutes and 12 hours even without sleep, so to pin down 
the early time-course this study looked at evolution of TI performance at an intermediate 
time point in the wake subjects as well.  
In animal experiments, animals are trained over the course of many days. Thus 
there is plenty of down-time over the course of training for the off-line process to occur 
and a gradient of expected value to develop, which could explain the fact that the 
symbolic distance effect is seen from the start of testing. The fact that single-session 
learning of the premise pairs is possible with human subjects motivates doing this study 
with humans rather than with other animals, even though the memory-recombination 
function of sleep is likely evolutionarily conserved. 
Human subjects present other challenges. Often all scores are at ceiling across the 
board. In many of the previous studies, human subjects have usually either a) explicitly 
known or surmised that there is a linear hierarchy, either from the instructions, or the 
observation that the premises are consistent with a linear hierarchy; or b) are over-trained 
(trained until they are at ceiling on the premises). In cases where they are aware that there 
is a linear hierarchy, explicit logical reasoning can explain the subjects’ performance. 
Logical reasoning is one of the most reliable coordination models. Frank et al. (2005) 
found that of their 65 subjects who learned the premise pairs, 8 subjects were explicitly 
aware of the hierarchy and thus that transitivity would apply; and these 8 subjects were at 
ceiling in all types of probes. The near-ceiling performance produced when human 
subjects use a logical reasoning strategy is likely to obscure any improvements due to off-
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line development of a preference gradient. Thus, any study using human subjects has to 
try to assess awareness. 
Explicit awareness of hierarchy: The assumptions that humans who are aware of 
the hierarchical relationship between the stimuli rely on logical, explicit reasoning, 
whereas those who are not aware rely on strategies similar to those used by rats and 
pigeons, has led to contention as to how to measure awareness, and exactly what we 
mean by the word “awareness”. Using more or less stringent criteria for judging 
“awareness”, some researchers have reported a correlation between subjects’ TI 
performance and their self-reported awareness of a hierarchy amongst the stimuli (Frank 
et al., 2005; Martin & Alsop, 2004; Smith & Squire, 2005), whereas others have reported 
no correlation (Greene, Gross, Elsinger, & Rao, 2006; Greene, Spellman, Dusek, 
Eichenbaum, & Levy, 2001) Even if human subjects report using logical reasoning based 
on their awareness of the task demands, this is not necessarily reliable; humans may use 
the same algorithm to provide an answer as do the rats, with their verbal abilities merely 
supplying a post hoc justification for their answers. Greene et al. (2001) found evidence 
for the development of task awareness after task competence developed. Regardless, it is 
certainly the case that factors that increase the likeliness of subjects reporting 
“awareness” also increase their ability to do the task (Kumaran & Ludwig, 2013; 
Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010). Various factors in how the training is implemented 
influence awareness, such as whether training trials are organized in blocked or 
randomized order (Greene, 2007). The fact that there is usually7 no symbolic distance 
                                                
7 Although there are exceptions. In Acuna, Sanes, & Donoghue (2002), symbolic distance 
effects were observed even though subjects were explicitly aware of the hierarchy. 
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effect when subjects report a high degree of awareness of the structure of the hierarchy is 
consistent with the possibility that they may be relying on explicit logical reasoning, as 
this is a coordination model.  
It is unlikely that many of the subjects in either of the studies reporting sleep effects 
on TI (Ellenbogen et al., 2007; Werchan & Gomez, 2013) were using logical reasoning to 
perform the task. Subjects were not told that there was a hierarchy nor told of any 
transitive relationship amongst the stimuli. Other parameters of the training protocol were 
those that have been shown to minimize task awareness: the stimuli were abstract visual 
patterns, which are difficult to encode verbally (see Figure 3.2); training trials were 
presented in intermixed order; and subjects were trained to a lower criterion of mastery 
than in most previous studies. TI scores in these studies were still not at ceiling after 
sleep, unlike subjects who reported the use of verbal reasoning strategies in previous TI 
studies. Furthermore, Werchan and Gomez excluded those subjects (10% of subjects 
recruited) who reported awareness of the hierarchy on a post-testing awareness 
questionnaire. Presumably subjects who report using explicit logical reasoning would 
develop TI ability sooner; however, this has not been tested because Werchan and Gomez 
did not test TI abilities within less than 12 hours in any subjects. Ellenbogen et al. did not 
administer awareness questionnaires, but did collect confidence ratings. They argue that 
the increased TI scores over time are not due to increased awareness, based on the fact 
that confidence ratings did not increase. However, confidence is a dubious proxy for 
“awareness”. One can be confident in responses that were arrived at by processes other 
than explicit application of transitive inference; or, one could explicitly apply transitive 
                                                                                                                                            
However the hierarchy was unusually long (11 items); because of this, use of explicit 
reasoning strategies may have presented too large a burden on working memory. 
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inference, but not be sure of the correctness of doing so. Thus, neither of these studies 
conclusively nailed down the effect of awareness on the time course of TI performance, 
or vice versa. We hypothesized that subjects who displayed great “awareness” on a 
questionnaire would be at ceiling on transitive inference very soon after training, but that 
others who did not could develop transitive inference over time. 
Although the performance of subjects in both Ellenbogen et al.’s study and 
Werchan and Gomez’s study was not similar to those in studies in which subjects were 
explicitly aware of the transitive relationships, neither was it similar to results previously 
obtained with animals or with non-aware human subjects—at least not until after subjects 
had slept. In contrast to previous studies on TI, Ellenbogen et al., and Werchan and 
Gomez, saw symbolic distance effects only when subjects had slept between training and 
testing. Their subjects who spent 12 hours awake were worse at the 2° pair than on either 
1° pair. Furthermore, most previous studies show a series position effect on the premise 
pairs. Ellenbogen’s subjects do not show this U-shaped performance curve; in fact, their 
immediate performance on AB is worse than other premises. If subjects remember that A 
is always rewarded, or that F is never rewarded, they should be able to trivially choose A 
without inference; and indeed, in prior studies, subjects have performed extremely well 
on the pair composed of the items at the ends. After 12 hours, Ellenbogen’s subjects had 
higher scores on AF than on either AB or EF, as would be expected; but their scores on 
AF were surprisingly low after only 20 minutes. 
These results are not consistent with the immediate use of elemental value of each 
stimulus, but are consistent with a delayed, post-sleep development of a gradient of value 
across the hierarchy. Based on the Ellenbogen results, we hypothesized that human 
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subjects who were trained only enough to have a tenuous grasp of each premise pair, not 
to ceiling, would initially mostly rely on the conjunctive value of the stimuli; i.e., 
although they would be able to respond correctly on the premise pairs, scores on any 
novel pairing would be low. After a delay, either awake or asleep, reliance on elemental 
value of stimuli would increase, reflected in an increased score on the end-item pair, but 
novel pairings involving only non-anchor items would require coordination of premises 
at retrieval, and thus not show symbolic distance effects. The off-line process would 
occur more slowly than in experiments involving more intensive training; but after sleep, 
the off-line process would have produced enough of a gradient of value amongst the 
hierarchy members to support transitive performance, and symbolic distance effects 
would be apparent, reflected in better accuracy on BE compared to the 1º pairs. 
Thus, although performance on 1° pairs is similar after 12 hours either awake or 
asleep, the mechanism by which these judgments are made may be markedly different. If 
E(X) were measured directly—for example, using forced choice between hierarchy 
members and a novel item—the rate at which the trained item is selected should vary 
across the hierarchy when there is a preference gradient. However, existing work has 
rarely tried to test the associative strength of individual members of the trained hierarchy. 
The work described below seeks to establish whether a novel item test—a set of test trials 
pairing each of the stimuli in the hierarchy with a previously not encountered, novel 
stimulus—is correlated with the symbolic distance effect. 
Ideally, it would be most informative to probe both the transitive inference abilities 
and elemental stimuli values in the same subjects over time, unless a prior exposure to the 
TI probe trials, or the novel item test, would alter or disrupt the normal course of 
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subjects’ memories over time and sleep. It is unfortunate that in both Ellenbogen et al.’s 
study and in Werchan and Gomez’s study, the subjects who were tested on inference 
pairs 12 hours after training were not also tested after only 20 minutes. We presume that 
they had improved over the 12 hours, because a separate set of subjects, recruited in the 
same way from the same population as Ellenbogen’s 12-hour subjects, and trained on the 
premise pairs using the same computerized task, were at chance when tested after only 20 
minutes. But we cannot exclude the possibility that the 20-minute group overrepresented 
subjects who could not do transitive inference, and the 12-hour groups overrepresented 
subjects who could, for unknown reasons. Without having tested the same subjects at 20 
minutes, improvement between 20 minutes and 12 hours has not been proven. But 
repeated measures is not possible in tasks where there is a learning effect, or in tasks 
where subjects’ exposure to the test alters their expectations regarding the future 
usefulness of what they have learned. As prior work had not tried to do repeated 
measures on this task in humans, the work described below attempts to settle this point in 
a first experiment, before using a repeated-measures design in a second, nap-based 
experiment. 
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Chapter III 
Materials and Methods 
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether transitive inference ability develops 
over a short (2.5 to 3 hour) period awake, and whether repeated measures are valid with 
the TI task. Subjects trained to criteria on the premise pairs of a six-item hierarchy. Some 
subjects were tested on transitive inference (TI) pairs at both 20 minutes and 3 hours after 
training. Others were tested only at 3 hours. All subjects remained awake between 
training and the 3 hour test. See Figure 3.1 for the protocol timeline. 
Participants: A total of 37 subjects (27 female) between the ages of 18 and 30 
(mean 21.4, standard deviation 3.0) were recruited by posting recruitment ads to the on-
line job boards at local universities, by inviting subjects who had previously participated 
 
Figure 3.1: Timeline of protocol for Experiment 1. 
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in other studies at the Center for Sleep and Cognition, and by posting tear-off flyers near 
the Beth Israel campus. Potential subjects were screened using an on-line surevy in 
REDcap, a secure database for health-related research data developed at Vanderbuilt 
University (Harris et al., 2009). All subjects reported having a typical bedtime between 
10 p.m. and 2 a.m., and a typical time in bed between 6 and 10 hours. By self-report, 
none had ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric, neurological, or sleep-related disorder, 
nor were they currently on any psychoactive medication. Subjects were required to keep a 
regular sleep schedule for 3 nights prior to the study visit day, abstain from alcohol and 
recreational drugs the day before the study, and cease consuming caffeine by 10 am of 
the study visit day. Subjects gave written informed consent approved by the Beth Israel 
Deaconess Medical Center Institutional Review Board and were paid in cash for their 
participation. 
Task: The Transitive Inference task as described in (Ellenbogen et al., 2007) was 
re-implemented in Java and run on PCs running Windows 7 at the Center for Sleep and 
Cognition at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center.  
Eight colorful ovals, shown in figure 3.2, were used as stimuli. Six of these were 
randomly selected and assigned positions in a hierarchy from A (most favored) to F (least 
favored); the remaining two were assigned to be X and Y in the novel-item test. As there 
are over 40,000 ways to order 8 items, the assignment of ovals to positions differed for 
each subject. Before the start of training, subjects saw the following instructions on-
screen: 
In this task, you will see two abstract patterns at a time. Your 
job is to decide which of the two patterns is covering a smiley face. 
 
If you think that the pattern on the LEFT covers a smiley face, 
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press the key labeled 'left'. If you think that the pattern on  
the RIGHT covers a smiley face, press the key labeled 'right'. 
 
At first, the task will seem very difficult, but over trials it 
will become easier.   
 
Immediately afterwards, before each round of training, subjects saw these 
instructions: 
Please keep your index fingers over the 'left' and 'right' keys 
during the task and respond as quickly and accurately as you can. 
 
After you make your response, the smiley face will appear if you 
are correct.  If you are incorrect, the smiley face will not appear. 
 
GOOD LUCK! 
For the first 18 subjects, only one round of training was allowed (see below); and 
for these subjects, the start-of-task instructions and the pre-training instructions were 
concatenated onto one screen. 
All training was randomized-order training. This training was organized into blocks 
of 10 trials, consisting of two presentations of each of the 5 premise pairs, in a 
pseudorandom 
order in each 
block. 
Consecutive 
trials during 
randomized-
order training 
never featured 
any of the 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Stimuli used in the Transitive Inference task 
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same stimuli. Each block had a different pseudorandom order, but these orders were the 
same for every subject. Within each block, each stimulus appeared an equal number of 
times on the left and right sides of the screen. 
On each trial, once the two stimuli appeared on screen, subjects were allowed 
unlimited time to make their selection. They selected the stimulus either to the right or to 
the left by pressing corresponding keys on a keyboard. On each training trial, after the 
subject guessed which item is correct, the selected item moved to the top of the screen to 
reveal either a smiley face indicating a correct choice, or nothing, indicating an incorrect 
choice. The first round of training consisted of at least 4 blocks (i.e., 40 trials), and 
subsequent rounds consisted of at least 2 blocks (i.e., 20 trials). Each round of training 
continued until the subject responded correctly at least once to each premise pair during 
each of the most recent 2 blocks, and the overall percentage correct over the course of 
those two blocks was at least 75%. For the first 18 subjects, only non-anchor pairs were 
considered in these calculations, duplicating the methods of Ellenbogen et al. (2007). For 
later subjects, all premise pairs were taken into consideration when calculating whether to 
exit training. See Discussion for the rationale for this change. Although the later version 
of the task is more stringent in the criteria to exit training—and in some cases subjects 
experienced additional blocks of training that they would not have with the earlier 
version—the mean number of blocks to reach criteria on the first round of training did 
not differ between subjects run with the two versions (older version: 7.8±0.9; newer 
version: 7.2±0.9; t(33)=0.49, p=0.62). This comparison includes all subjects in 
Experiment 1, regardless of whether they met inclusion criteria, except for two outlier 
subjects who completed 30 blocks of training without meeting exit criteria. Regardless of 
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whether a subject reached these criteria, training would not continue past a total of 30 
blocks across all rounds of training. 
Following each round of training, subjects were instructed to relax and read 
magazines for 5 minutes, then had an Immediate Test. Testing was similar to training, 
except without feedback: after the subject’s response, the stimuli merely disappeared, 
rather than moving to potentially reveal a smiley face. The Immediate Test consisted of 5 
blocks of 10 trials, each block consisting of two presentations of each of the 5 premise 
pairs (once each with the preferred item on the left and on the right), in a different 
pseudo-random order in each block. To pass the Immediate Test, subjects had to get each 
inner (non-anchor) premise pair correct at least 50% of the time, and a score of at least 
70% overall on the inner premise pairs. The first 18 subjects were allowed only one 
round of training, and thus only one chance to pass the Immediate Test; but the remaining 
subjects, after each failed attempt at the Immediate Test, had another round of training 
and another opportunity to attempt the test, until they had passed the Immediate Test or 
completed a total of 30 blocks of training. Subjects who did not pass their final attempt 
on the Immediate Test (n=9) were excluded from further analysis.  
Inference Testing consisted of 5 blocks of 18 trials each: 10 trials testing the 
premise pairs, 6 trials testing the inference pairs (BD, CE, BE), and 2 trials testing pair 
AF. Novel-item testing consisted of 4 blocks of 36 trials each, in randomized order: 10 
trials of the premise pairs; 24 trials of the novel item pairs (pairing each of the 6 item in 
the hierarchy with each of 2 novel items X and Y); and 2 trials of the novel items X and 
Y against each other. For some subjects, the transition from Inference Test to Novel-item 
Test was not marked by any pause or new instructions. But for 5 subjects in the 3hr group 
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and 5 subjects in the 20min/3hr group, these instructions appeared on screen before the 
novel-item test: 
We have reached the last phase of this session. You will again see  
abstract patterns. Some of the patterns will be ones you have seen before, 
and some will be new. The smiley face hides behind a new pattern  
about half the time. But we still are not showing you where the  
smiley face is! Just make your best guess, based on what you learned so far.  
Try to use your gut feeling and respond quickly, don't spend much 
time thinking about your choices. 
Assignment to Groups: Subjects were assigned to groups by the Multi-dimensional 
Prospective Randomizer Server (PR). The goal of the PR is to keep the groups as closely 
matched as possible in the characteristics that seem most likely to confound the outcome 
measure that is to be compared between groups. In this case we were testing the 
hypothesis that subjects’ scores on TI pairs at the 3 hour test would depend on whether 
they were tested at 20 minutes. We can control this factor—the intended independent 
variable—but we cannot sufficiently control other factors which could contribute to TI 
performance at 3 hours. Plausibly, both amount of training exposure, and the level of 
mastery of the premise pairs, could impact TI performance. Amount of training exposure 
was constrained to between 4 and 30 blocks; to constrain this more tightly than that 
would increase the variance in the level of mastery of the premise pairs. If, by random 
assignment, one group had more training exposure, or higher premise pair performance, 
than other groups, this would make the interpretation of any differences in TI score at 3 
hours ambiguous. Use of the PR was designed to avoid this scenario.  
The PR was run as a server on a separate computer so that it could handle 
simultaneous requests from multiple clients, in case there was more than one subject 
doing the task on the same day. On the PR computer, records were maintained of all the 
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previously run subjects who had successfully completed the protocol, with their group 
assignments, the number of training blocks each one had completed, and their scores on 
the Immediate Test. The task computer connected to the PR via a TCP/IP socket. As soon 
as the subject completed their final iteration of the Immediate Test, the task computer 
submitted their immediate test score and the number of training blocks they had 
completed (along with the subject ID) to the PR. Subjects were not assigned to a group 
until the moment that the groups’ protocols diverged: at the end of the 20 minute rest 
period after the Immediate Test, at which point the computer would administer the 
Inference Test, the Inference Test and Novel-item Test, or no test, depending on group 
assignment. At the moment in time when the task computer had to decide which test(s) to 
administer, it would contact the PR to obtain the group assignment. The PR would choose 
a group for the subject based on the groups’ existing composition.  
The PR is designed to add subjects to each group at the same rate, so that groups 
are closely matched in their distribution across time. (Amongst groups that are still 
accepting subjects, that is; we closed the 20min*/3hr group after running only a few 
subjects, due to scheduling concerns.) Thus, when one open group has fewer subjects 
already assigned to it than the other(s), PR assigns the new subject to the smaller group 
regardless of scores. However, when PR has to choose between two or more groups of 
equal size, it makes the decision in a more interesting way. When the PR has to make 
such a decision, it calculates the means and standard deviations of each of the variables of 
interest, for the entire sample of subjects it knows about—including those already 
assigned to a group, and subjects who had scores submitted that day but were not yet 
assigned a group. It then normalizes the values for each variable for each subject by 
  
42 
subtracting the relevant mean, and dividing by 
the relevant standard deviation. We can think 
of each subject as a vector in 
multidimensional space (2-dimensional, in 
this case); the origin of the space is the mean 
of all known subjects, and the length and 
direction of the vector represents how a 
subject differs from the mean. The PR then 
finds the average vector for each group, and 
the dot product of the new subject’s vector 
with each group average vector, then chooses 
the group for which this dot product is 
smallest (or most negative). This has the 
effect of assigning a subject to that group that 
most needs to be pulled in that subject’s 
direction; for example, if the groups diverge 
in mean number of training blocks, and a 
subject has a high number of training blocks, 
assigning the subject to the group with the 
lower mean number of training blocks pulls 
that group closer to the mean in that 
dimension. See Figure 3.3.  
Protocol: After completing consent 
 
Figure 3.3: Graphical representation 
of Prospective Randomizer algorithm 
for assigning subjects to groups. Red, 
blue, and green dots represent 
subjects already assigned to groups 
A, B, and C respectively. The black 
dot is a subject who has not yet been 
assigned to a group. X and Y 
coordinates of each dot are the 
number of training blocks and 
premise pair score, each normalized 
by the mean and standard deviation 
of the corresponding variable. PR 
will not consider assigning to group 
C because it has more subjects than 
the other two groups. In deciding 
between groups A and B, it finds the 
mean vectors for these groups (fat 
arrows). The dot product of the 
vector for the new subject (thin black 
arrow) and each of the group average 
vectors is calculated. The dot product 
with the B vector (-1.57) is more 
negative than the dot product with the 
A vector (1.33), thus the subject will 
be assigned to group B. Intuitively 
this makes sense: the existing 
composition of group A over-
represents, and B under-represents, 
subjects with parameters similar to 
the unassigned subject.  
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forms, subjects filled out sleep logs and other questionnaires regarding sleep habits. 
Subjects began the training session of the TI task at approximately 12:00 noon (mean 
time: 12:09, range: 11:08 to 13:08). Groups did not differ in the mean clock times of the 
start of training (means ± s.e.m.: 20min/3hr: 12:17 ± 9 min; 3hr: 12:01 ± 9 min; 
20min*/3hr: 12:01 ± 1 min; F(2,25)=0.93, p=0.41), nor in the amount of time they took 
to train to criteria, defined as the time from their first training trial to the completion of 
their final attempt at the immediate test (20min/3hr: 8 ± 2 minutes; 3hr: 8 ± 1 minutes; 
20min*/3hr: 5 ± 1 minutes; F(2,25)= 0.60, p=0.56). After the completion of training and 
the final immediate test, subjects were instructed to read magazines for 20 minutes. At 
the end of the 20 minute break, the computer connected to the Prospective 
Randomization Server to assign the subject to one of 3 groups, and administered any 
test(s) for that group. Subjects in the 20min/3hr group (n=12) did the Inference testing; 
subjects in the 20min*/3hr group (n=4) did both the Inference testing and Novel-item 
Test; and subjects in the 3hr group (n=12) did neither test. At the completion of the 
appropriate test(s), “Thank you! Done for now.” appeared on the screen.   
Subjects were then given lunch, and allowed to pursue whatever daytime waking 
activity they wished until they had to return. Most subjects studied or did homework, 
although some went home or shopping, or ran errands. Subjects returned to the lab for a 
second visit scheduled to start 3 hours after the start of their first visit. Upon returning to 
the lab, subjects did a questionnaire including the Stanford Sleepiness Scale (Hoddes, 
Zarcone, Smythe, Phillips, & Dement, 1973) and questions about their alertness, and then 
began the 3 hour test. Subjects started the “3 hour test” session, on average, 169 minutes 
after they started training (range: 154 to 177 minutes). These groups did not differ in this 
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(means as hours:minutes ± s.e.m. in minutes: 20min/3hr: 2:49 ± 2; 3hr: 2:49 ± 1; 
20min*/3hr: 2:51 ± 2; F(2,25)=0.32, p=0.73), or the length of time interval from the end 
of training until the 3 hour test (means as hours:minutes ± s.e.m. in minutes: 20min/3hr: 
2:39 ± 2; 3hr: 2:39 ± 2; 20min*/3hr: 2:45 ± 3; F(2,25)= 1.04, p=0.37). For all subjects the 
3 hour test consisted of the Inference Test followed by the Novel-item Test. 
After subjects completed testing, they completed a debriefing questionnaire shown 
in Box 3.1 to assess their awareness of the task structure and their strategies. Subjects had 
to complete each page of the questionnaire before going to the next page, and were not 
permitted to go back to earlier pages to revise answers. This questionnaire was based on 
the questionnaire used by (Frank et al., 2005) but modified to elicit information about 
how subjects encoded the premise pairs, and whether they were aware of, and how they 
approached, the novel-item pairings. Unlike Frank et al., our awareness questionnaire did 
not mention the word “hierarchy” until the last page. 
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Analyses: Data files output by the task program were processed to extract summary 
information using scripts written in Python version 2.6.1. Statistical tests were performed 
using R, version 3.2.1. All t-tests were preceded by Bartlett test of homogeneity of 
variances, and whether the pooled variance was used to estimate the variance, or whether 
the Welch approximation of degrees of freedom was used, depended on whether the 
variances were significantly different between groups. To assess whether experiencing 
Box 3.1 
Awareness Questionnaire 
Page 1: 
Did you have the impression that some of the pairs of patterns were easier to choose 
between than others? (Yes/No) 
Did you think any of the patterns were ALWAYS correct (no matter what the other 
pattern was)? (Yes/No) 
Did you think that any of the patterns were ALWAYS incorrect (no matter what the 
other pattern was)? (Yes/No) 
Did you have any tricks for memorizing the individual patterns or the pairs of 
patterns? (Yes/No) 
If so, explain briefly. 
 
Page 2: 
Did you give the patterns names? (Yes/No) 
If so, give examples. 
Did you have the impression that there was some kind of logical rule or order? 
(Yes/No) 
If so, please explain briefly. 
 
Page 3: 
In the test phase, did you notice any new combinations of patterns taken from those 
you saw before in the training phase? (Yes/No) 
How did you make your choice in these cases? (e.g., guessed, went with instinct, used 
some sort of rule. Please explain.) 
In the test phase, did you notice any new patterns that you hadn't see in the training 
phase? (Yes/No) 
How did you make your choice in these cases? 
 
Page 4: 
Did you think that there was a hierarchy among the patterns seen in training? That is, 
did you think they could be ranked from "best" to "worst"? (Yes/No) 
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the Inference test at 20 minutes affected inference performance at the 3 hour test, we used 
a two-tailed t-test to test whether the performance of subjects on transitive inference pairs 
(BD, CE, and BE) in the 20min/3hr group at their 3 hour test was different from the 
performance of subjects in the 3hr group at their 3-hour test (at 0.05 level of 
significance). As this revealed no significant difference, within-group repeated measures 
of just the 20min/3hr and 20min*/3hr groups were used for all remaining analyses. 
To determine whether transitive inference ability develops over the course of 
approximately 2.5 to 3 hours awake, we used paired t-tests to compare subjects’ scores at 
20 minutes and 3 hours on transitive pairs, both 1º (BD and CE) and 2º (BE), and on the 
non-transitive end-anchor pair (AF). Not being sure whether exposure to the novel-item 
test at the 20 minute test would affect any off-line processes, these comparisons were run 
on data from the 20min/3hr and the 20min*/3hr group pooled together, and again on just 
the 20min/3hr group. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to determine whether transitive inference ability 
develops more over the course of a nap than over an equivalent time spent awake, and 
whether there are correlations between amount of time spent in particular sleep stages 
and subsequent transitive inference. Subjects trained to criteria on the premise pairs of the 
six-item hierarchy as used in Experiment 1. Subjects were tested on transitive pairs both 
at 20 minutes and at 3 hours. All subjects had EEG electrodes attached to their heads. 
Some subjects (the Nap group) took a PSG-monitored nap between the testing sessions 
while others (the Wake group) remained awake. See Figure 3.4 for the protocol timeline. 
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Participants: A total of 45 subjects (35 female) between the ages of 18 and 30 
(mean 22.2, standard deviation 2.8) were recruited via the same recruitment channels as 
in Experiment 1. In addition to the inclusion and exclusion criteria listed for Experiment 
1, subjects were also excluded if they reported drinking more than 5 alcoholic drinks per 
week, more than 3 caffeinated drinks per day, or working a shift work job. Subjects who 
reported travel across more than one time zone within the previous month had their 
participation delayed until at least a month had elapsed. Subjects who did not pass their 
final attempt on the immediate test (n=8) were excluded from further analysis, and 
additionally one subject withdrew participation due to illness; thus we report data only 
from the 36 subjects who met inclusion criteria and completed the protocol. As subjects 
who have very high scores after only 20 minutes cannot show much later improvement, 
subjects were recruited until there were 12 subjects in each group who were not at ceiling 
 
Figure 3.4: Timeline of protocol for Experiment 2. 
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on transitive inference pairs at the 20 minute test; and many of the analyses include only 
this subset of 24 “non-ceiling” subjects. 
Task: The task was as described in Experiment 1 above, except that for 4 subjects 
who had not passed the immediate test by the 21st block of training, blocked-order mode 
training was introduced, and the maximum number of training blocks was increased to 
36. In blocked-order training, blocks 21 and 22 consisted of 4 consecutive presentations 
of each premise pair; blocks 25 to 27 consisted of 6 consecutive presentations of each 
pair; and blocks 30 to 33 consisted of 8 consecutive presentations of each pair. (All other 
blocks were in randomized order.) Within the blocked-order training, each series of trials 
featuring a particular premise pair would be followed by trials of a non-overlapping 
premise pair; for example, a series of consecutive presentations of BC might be followed 
by a series of consecutive presentations of DE or EF, never by AB or CD. To exit a round 
of training, subjects had to achieve criteria (a score of 75% or better overall, and at least 
50% on each premise pair in each block) over the course of two consecutive randomized-
order training blocks. Thus, for example, training would not discontinue after block 21, 
22, or 23, but could discontinue after block 24. The revised criteria for exiting training 
(requiring 50% per pair per block, and 75% overall, on all premise pairs, not just the 
internal pairs) were used for all subjects. All subjects performed the Inference test 20 
minutes after completing training, and the Inference test followed by the Novel-item test 
3 hours after training. All subjects saw the Novel-item instructions before the Novel-item 
test. 
Protocol: Subjects arrived at the lab at 11:00 am. After giving consent, subjects 
filled out, in REDCap, a sleep log for the prior three nights, the Epworth Sleepiness Scale 
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(Johns, 1991), the Stanford Sleepiness Scale (Hoddes et al., 1973), and other questions 
about their sleep habits and alertness level. Electrodes were then attached as described 
below, then subjects ate lunch. Training on the premise pairs began shortly after noon 
(mean start of training time amongst non-ceiling subjects: Nap: 12:25 ± 7 minutes; Wake: 
12:18 ± 3 minutes; these do not differ, t(22)= 0.82, p=0.42). The non-ceiling subjects in 
the Nap and Wake groups did not differ in the length of time from start of training until 
the end of training (in minutes: Nap: 11 ± 3; Wake: 15 ± 3; t(22)= 1.01, p=0.32). During 
the 5 minute rest period(s) between training and Immediate test, and the 20 minute rest 
period between Immediate test and Inference test, subjects were instructed to read 
magazines. A pile of magazines on a variety of subject matter and covering a range of 
reading levels was provided.  
At the end of the 20 minute Inference test, the task computer submitted the overall 
score on inference pairs to the Multi-dimensional Prospective Randomizer server, which 
assigned subjects to Nap or Wake. For Nap group subjects (n=19), electrode placement 
was finalized, all light sources were blocked, and subjects were put to bed to try to sleep, 
and PSG recording was started. Wake group subjects (n=17) were taken on a walking 
tour of the surrounding hallways and then offered a selection of television shows to 
watch. Ninety minutes later, Nap subjects were awoken, electrodes were removed from 
all subjects, and subjects were given the opportunity to wash their hair. Subjects were 
given the opportunity to read, continue watching television, or walk, until approximately 
3 hours had elapsed since the start of training.  
Subjects then answered a short REDCap survey about their alertness level and 
began the 3 hour testing session, consisting of the Inference test followed by the Novel-
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item test. Time elapsed between the start of training and the start of the 3 hour test was 
not different for the Nap and Wake group (for non-ceiling subjects: Nap: 3:07 ± 2 
minutes; Wake: 3:05 ± 3 minutes; t(22)= 0.51, p=0.62). Nor did time between the end of 
training and the start of the 3 hour test differ (Nap: 2:54 ± 3 minutes; Wake: 2:48 ± 4 
minutes; t(22)= 1.42, p=0.17). Immediately after testing, subjects filled out the 
Awareness questionnaire. 
Polysomnography: A subset of the 10/20 system electrode placement locations 
were used: scalp locations F3, F4, C3, C4, O1, and O2; mastoid placements A1 and A2; 
ocular channels LOC and ROC; and chin placements EMG1 and EMG2. The ground 
electrode was placed on the subject’s collarbone and the reference electrode on the 
subject’s forehead. Twelve of these 14 electrodes—all electrodes except those on the 
chin—were placed before the TI training session. The remaining electrodes, EMG1 and 
EMG2, were not placed until just before the nap, and only for subjects in the Nap group. 
Once these electrodes were placed, impedances were checked, and electrodes replaced as 
needed, to try to get all impedances below 10 kOhm.  
Subjects in the Nap group slept in bedrooms equipped with Grass AURA LTM64 
polysomnography (PSG) recording systems (Grass Technologies, Rhode Island). Each 
EEG and ocular channel was referenced against its contralateral mastoid, and the EMG 
channel consisted of the two chin electrodes referenced against each other. PSG data 
were visually scored in 30-s epochs according to the sleep staging criteria described in 
the 2007 version of the American Academy of Sleep Medicine manual for scoring sleep 
(Iber, Ancoli-Israel, Chesson, & Quan, 2007). 
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Analyses: Subjects who, at the 20 minute test, were near ceiling on TI ability 
(having an average score of 90% or above on all the transitive pairs BD, CE, and BE, and 
a score of 85% or above both on the 1º pairs (BD and CE) and on the 2º pair (BE)) were 
excluded from between-group comparisons of improvement on the task and sleep stage 
correlations. Amongst the remaining Nap (n=12) and Wake (n=12) subjects, to determine 
whether a nap affects transitive inference ability, we did t-tests to compare the mean 
change in scores from 20 minutes to 3 hours on 1º and 2º pairs between the two groups. 
Furthermore, amongst the Nap subjects, to assess the relationships between each sleep 
stage and changes in their transitive inference ability, we linearly regressed the amount of 
improvement on 1º and 2º pairs against time in REM, N1 sleep, N2 sleep, and N3 sleep.   
Analyses on Pooled Experiments 1 and 2 data: Free-text responses on the 
Awareness Questionnaire were scored independently by 3 judges on a scale from 0 to 3 
for the extent to which each subject reported thinking of the stimuli as having a hierarchy 
from most powerful to least powerful. The median of the three judges’ scores for each 
participant was taken as their “awareness score”. Four of the questions on the Awareness 
Questionnaire, the second and third question on page 1 and the first and third questions 
on page 3, were yes/no questions regarding whether subjects had noticed and observed 
objectively true features of the task.   
The Novel-item Test was analyzed by fitting a line, using linear regression, to each 
subject’s data individually. (As only 4 subjects did the Novel-item Test at the 20 minute 
testing session, only data from the 3 hour testing session was included in these analyses.) 
Points to which a subject’s line was fitted had, as their y values, the percentage trials on 
which each item was chosen when presented with a novel item, and as their x values, the 
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items’ positions in the 
hierarchy. The slopes of these 
lines were taken as the 6-item 
Novel-item Test (NiT) slopes. 
(Positions in the hierarchy 
were coded such that higher-
ranked items were numerically 
higher, so that a positive slope 
would reflect a tendency to 
choose higher-ranked items 
more frequently than lower-
ranked items. See Figure 3.5) 
To test the whether subjects 
had developed a preference for higher-ranked items in the hierarchy—expressed as a 
tendency to choose higher-ranked items more frequently than lower-ranked items when 
paired with novel items—we tested the hypothesis that the mean of the 6-item NiT slopes 
was significantly greater than zero. 
A preference gradient can only support transitive inference performance if the 
items in the inference probe trials (items B, C, D, and E) are sufficiently distinguished. 
To test whether subjects had developed preferences for the higher-ranked items amongst 
the non-anchor items, we fitted a line for each subject to just items B to E on the Novel-
item test percentages, and tested whether the mean slope for these lines (the mean 4-item 
NiT slope) was significantly greater than zero. To test whether preferences gradients, as 
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Figure 3.5: Slopes of novel-item scores versus 
hierarchy position for two example subjects. One 
subject (blue dots) chooses the hierarchy member 
over the novel item at a higher rate for higher-
ranked items, and the slope of the regression line is 
about 20 percentage points per hierarchy position. 
Another (red dots) chooses the novel item at about 
the same rate when paired with any item of the 
hierarchy, and the slope of the regression line is 
close to 0. 
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revealed on the Novel-item test, supported transitive inference performance, we tested 
whether subjects with stronger gradients (more positive slopes) had higher scores on the 
transitive pairs on the Inference Test that immediately preceded the Novel-item Test. To 
test the hypothesis that a preference gradient based strategy produced more accurate 
performance on 2º pairs than 1º pairs (the symbolic distance effect), we tested for a 
correlation between 4-item NiT slope and the difference between 2º score and 1º score—
again using data from the same testing session as the Novel-item Test, in case the 
strength of the preference gradient (and the dominant strategy) changed over time. To test 
our hypothesis that a stronger preference gradient at the later time results in 2º pairs 
improving relative to 1º pairs, we regressed change from 20 minutes to 3 hours in 2º 
score minus 1º score against 4-item NiT slope. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
 
Experiment 1: One-way ANOVAs were conducted to confirm that all three groups 
were very similar in their training performance. The three groups did not differ in number 
of training blocks completed (20min/3hr: 8.8 ± 1.4; 3hr: 8.3 ± 0.9; 20min*/3hr: 8.3 ± 1.8; 
F(2,25)= 0.05, p=0.95), their score on premise pairs in the Immediate Test (20min/3hr: 
93 ± 2; 3hr: 94 ± 2; 20min*/3hr: 93 ± 2; F(2,25)= 0.02, p=0.98), or number of iterations 
of the Immediate Test (20min/3hr: 1.3 ± 0.2; 3hr: 1.3 ± 0.1; 20min*/3hr: 1.0 ± 0.0; 
F(2,25)= 0.65, p=0.53). The freakishly high p-values for the tests for numbers of training 
blocks and Immediate Test scores confirm that PR was successful in assigning subjects to 
groups strategically to keep the values of these variables well-matched between groups. 
Random assignment would have had only a 0.1% chance of resulting in groups that were 
this similar in these parameters. Thus, we were successful in avoiding differences in 
training history between the groups that could confound the interpretation of any 
differences found at the 3 hour time. 
Next we asked whether the set of tests experienced 20 minutes after training had 
any measurable effect on subjects’ performance when they were tested 3 hours later. 
Subjects in the 3hr and 20min/3hr groups did not differ in their overall performance on 
either premise pairs (20min/3hr: 87% ± 3; 3hr: 90% ± 3; t(22)= 0.64; p=0.53) or 
transitive inference pairs (20min/3hr: 54% ± 10; 3hr: 50% ± 11; t(22)= 0.31, p=0.76) at 3 
hours. Nor, within the inference pairs, did they differ in their performance specifically on 
the 1º pairs (20min/3hr: 55% ± 10; 3hr: 50% ± 10; t(22)= 0.35, p=0.73) or 2º pairs 
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(20min/3hr: 53% ± 13; 3hr: 50% ± 13; t(22)=0.18, p=0.86). End-anchor pair performance 
also did not differ (20min/3hr: 88% ± 9; 3hr: 77% ± 10; t(22)=0.79, p=0.44). See Figure 
4.1. Thus, having done the inference test at 20 minutes does not appear to affect later 
performance, and therefore we used within-subject comparisons wherever possible. An 
insufficient number of subjects were run in the 20min*/3hr group to formally test 
whether their performance at 3 hours matched the other two groups, thus we draw no 
conclusion regarding whether doing the Novel-item Test affects later performance.  
We evaluated whether performance on transitive inference pairs changed between 
the two testing sessions. Paired two-tailed t-tests were conducted to compare 20 minute 
 
Figure 4.1: Experiment 1, 3 hour comparison. Comparisons of distributions of 
scores on the 3 hour test between subjects who did (light grey) or did not (white) 
do the 20 minute Inference Test. Center lines show the medians; box limits 
indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles as determined by R software; whiskers 
extend 1.5 times the interquartile range from the 25th and 75th percentiles, outliers 
are represented by dots; crosses represent sample means; medium grey bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals of the means; data points are plotted as open 
circles. n = 12 sample points. Plots generated using BoxPlotR at 
http://boxplot.tyerslab.com/ (Spitzer M., 2014) 
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and 3 hour scores on transitive inference pairs changed amongst subjects who performed 
the inference test at both times. (See Table 1.) Pooling results from the 20min*/3hr and 
20min/3hr groups, we find no change in score on either 1º pairs (mean ± s.e.m. change in 
score: +3.8% ± 3.3; t(15)= 1.13, p=0.27) nor on 2º pairs (-1.9% ± 7.2; t(15)= 0.26, 
p=0.80). Nor did these subjects improve on the end-anchor pair (-3.1% ± 2.2; t(15)= 1.43, 
p=0.17). Excluding subjects who performed the novel-item test at 20 minutes does not 
meaningfully change these results for either 1º pairs (+3.3% ± 4.1; t(11)= 0.80, p=0.44), 
for 2º pairs (-5.8% ± 9.2; t(11)= 0.64, p=0.54), or for the end-anchor pair (-4.2% ± 2.8; 
t(11)=1.45, p=0.18). In any case, there is no improvement. 
This was not because subjects were already displaying transitive inference ability at 
20 minutes. Amongst all subjects who achieved an adequate score on the Immediate Test 
and did the Inference Test at 20 minutes, the mean score on 1º pairs was 55% ± 8, not 
significantly different from chance (t(15)= 0.59, p=0.56), and the mean score on 2º pairs 
was 59% ± 10, not significantly different from chance (t(15)= 0.85, p=0.41). These 
results are consistent with Ellenbogen et al.’s findings in their 20-minute group.8 With 
                                                
8 However, our subjects were significantly better than Ellenbogen et al.’s on the end-
anchor pair at 20 minutes (our study: 94% ± 5; Ellenbogen et al.: 69% ± 9; t(26)=2.7, 
p=0.013). 
Table 1 
Experiment 1, TI scores for each group, at each testing session (means ± s.e.m.); 
and changes in score. Change in score is 3 hour score minus 20 minute score, not 
percentage of baseline. 
group 1º at 20 
minutes 
1º at 3 
hours 
! 1º 2º at 20 
minutes 
2º at 3 
hours 
! 2º 
3hr  50% ± 10   50% ± 13  
20min/3hr 51% ± 9 55% ± 10 3% ± 4 59% ± 12 53% ± 13 -6% ± 9 
20min*/3hr 65% ± 18 70% ± 15 5% ± 5 58% ± 21 68% ± 20 10% ± 7 
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these scores, subjects were overall nowhere near ceiling, and improvements should have 
been possible. But 3 hour scores on transitive pairs were still not different from chance 
(all p>0.4). 
Experiment 2: Unlike in Experiment 1, transitive inference scores of subjects in 
Experiment 2 were significantly above chance 20 minutes after completion of the 
immediate test. At 20 minutes, the mean score on 1º pairs was 69% ± 5 (significantly 
different from 50%: t(35)= 3.83, p=0.0005), and on the 2º pairs 83% ± 5 (significantly 
different from 50%: t(35)= 6.89, p<0.0001). (See Figure 4.2.) A paired t-test shows that 
at 20 minutes, 2º scores are significantly higher than 1º scores (t(35)= 2.9, p=0.007), 
contrary to what we would expect based on Ellenbogen et al.’s results. Whereas in 
Experiment 1, only 12.5% of subjects who performed the Inference Test at 20 minutes 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Discrepancy at baseline between experiments. Scores on 1º pairs (top) 
and 2º pairs (bottom) at the 20 minute test, Experiment 1 (white) vs. Experiment 2. 
Center lines show the medians; box limits indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles as 
determined by R software; whiskers extend 1.5 times the interquartile range from 
the 25th and 75th percentiles, outliers are represented by dots; crosses represent 
sample means; medium grey bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the means. 
The heavy dashed line is at 50%, at-chance level of performance. Plots generated 
using BoxPlotR at http://boxplot.tyerslab.com/ (Spitzer M., 2014) 
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met our definition of “ceiling” at that point, of the Experiment 2 subjects, 33.3% were at 
ceiling at 20 minutes. We hypothesized that improvements in TI performance over time 
were possible amongst subjects who were not already proficient at 20 minutes; for that 
reason, all analyses below looking at improvements in performance on transitive pairs 
include only the 24 non-ceiling subjects. 
T-tests were conducted to confirm that non-ceiling subjects in the Nap and Wake 
groups were similar in their training performance and initial (20-minute) performance on 
transitive inference pairs. They did not differ in number of training blocks completed 
(Nap: 14 ± 3; Wake: 18 ± 3; t(22)= 1.08, p=0.29), their score on premise pairs in their 
final Immediate Test (Nap: 95% ± 2; Wake: 94% ± 2; t(22)= 0.23, p=0.82), or the 
number of times they took the Immediate Test (Nap: 1.3 ± 0.1; Wake: 1.4 ± 0.1; t(22)= 
0.41, p=0.69). On the Inference Test at 20 minutes, mean scores achieved by non-ceiling 
subjects were not significantly different between the Nap and Wake groups on 1º pairs 
(Nap: 56% ± 8; Wake: 53% ± 7; t(22)= 0.31, p=0.76) and on 2º pairs (Nap: 73% ± 10; 
Wake: 76% ± 9; t(22)= 0.25, p=0.80). Thus, were there any differences in improvement 
evident at 3 hours, the interpretation of these differences would not be confounded by 
baseline differences. 
We asked whether either the nap or the time elapsed between testing sessions 
produced any changes in performance on TI pairs. Subjects in the Wake group who were 
not at ceiling at 20 minutes improved by 2 ± 4 percentage points on 1º pairs, and 
decreased by 3 ± 3 percentage points on 2º pairs. Subjects in the Nap group who were not 
at ceiling at 20 minutes showed 5 ± 3 percentage points improvement on 1º pairs, and 3 ± 
4 percentage points improvement on 2º pairs, at 3 hours. None of these improvements 
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were statistically significant, but the change on 1º pairs in the Nap group shows a trend 
towards improvement (t(11)= 1.96, p=0.08). Neither the mean improvements in 1º pairs 
nor in 2º pairs is significantly different between the Nap and Wake groups (1º: t(22)= 
0.52, p=0.61; 2º: t(22)= 
1.47, p=0.16). (See Figure 
4.3.) As in the first 
experiment, no off-line 
improvements appeared 
after only 2.5 to 3 hours; 
and the addition of a nap 
in that time did not make 
any apparent difference.  
In spite of the lack of improvement on average, there remained the possibility that 
differences in improvement amongst subjects were related to sleep parameters. Table 2 
shows a summary of nap polysomnography data from the 12 non-ceiling subjects in the 
Nap group. Linear regressions of improvement on 1º pairs and 2º pairs against total sleep 
time reveal that total sleep time does not predict either. For 1º pairs the slope of the 
regression line is -0.03, 
indicating a 0.03 
percentage point 
decrease in score per 30-
second epoch of sleep. 
This is neither 
 
Figure 4.3: Improvements in transitive pair scores for 
non-ceiling subjects were not significant in either group. 
(Error bars are s.e.m.) 
Table 2 
Nap sleep architecture: 
N1 5.3 (4.8) 
N2 36.0 (9.0) 
N3 19.9 (15.3) 
R 12.8 (8.0) 
Total Sleep Time 74.0 (15.4) 
Values are mean (standard deviation) minutes in each 
sleep stage. 
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statistically significant (p=0.87) nor meaningfully significant. For 2º pairs the slope is -
0.37, again neither statistically significant (p=0.13) nor meaningfully significant. 
Multiple regression of 1º pair and 2º pair improvements against time in each stage of 
sleep (N1, N2, N3, and REM) reveal one significant coefficient: scores on 2º pairs 
decrease by 0.52 percentage point per 30-second epoch of N3 sleep (p=0.048). But the 
overall p-value of the model was 0.21, indicating a 21% chance that coefficients at least 
as large as these would be found in the absence of any real relationships. Thus we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, which states that sleep architecture had no effect on change in 
TI scores. 
Analyses on Pooled Data: Due to a computer issue, trial-by-trial data from the 
training portion of the task for one subject in the Nap group was lost. This subject was at 
ceiling at 20 minutes, and thus not included in the analyses of improvements or sleep 
correlations above. This subject is included in analyses below for which we have the 
relevant data. 
Awareness Questionnaire: We asked how many of the subjects gave responses on 
the Awareness Questionnaire that were consistent with the use of explicit logical 
reasoning strategies. In some studies (Werchan & Gomez, 2013) such subjects would be 
excluded from the main analyses, and in others (Frank et al., 2005) they would be 
analyzed separately. We wanted to find out whether there were enough of these “aware” 
subjects to justify re-doing analyses with the aware subjects excluded, in case they were 
obscuring group effects. Pooling data across the two experiments, and including subjects 
who were at ceiling on TI pairs at 20 minutes, only 12.5% of subjects were given a 
median score of 3 (indicating a high degree of awareness of the hierarchy) on the free-
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text responses on the Awareness Questionnaire. Each of these subjects also answered 
“yes” to the “Did you think that there was a hierarchy…” question. Surprisingly, 
however, having a high awareness score did not necessarily entail correctly answering 
yes/no questions to which subjects should have answered “yes” if they successfully 
observed and explicitly remembered some aspects of the structure of the task. Of the 18 
subjects who obtained a score of 2 or 3, 89% answered “yes” to “Did you think any of the 
patterns were ALWAYS correct (no matter what the other pattern was)?”, but only 67% 
answered “yes” to “Did you think that any of the patterns were ALWAYS incorrect (no 
matter what the other pattern was)?” and a mere 56% answered “yes” to “In the test 
phase, did you notice any new combinations of patterns taken from those you saw before 
in the training phase?” and 56% answered “yes” to “In the test phase, did you notice any 
new patterns that you hadn't see in the training phase?” Overall there was a correlation of 
only 0.07 between awareness score and the number of these questions answered correctly 
amongst the included subjects. This is a very small correlation, and not statistically 
significant (p=0.58). This indicates a surprising dissociation between being able to 
correctly answer questions about what was experienced during the task, and either 
noticing or being able to explain that the stimuli could be organized into a hierarchy. 
Thus, very few subjects gave responses on the Awareness Questionnaire that we would 
expect from someone using logical reasoning strategies. Only 2 subjects out of the 64 
who met inclusion criteria both had a median score of 3 on the free-text responses and 
answered all 4 yes/no questions with objectively true answers. Both of these subjects 
were in the Nap group of Experiment 2, and were already excluded from analyses of 
improvements and sleep stages due to being at ceiling at 20 minutes. This is consistent 
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with our expectations that subjects who fully understood the task at an explicit level 
would be at ceiling.  
We wanted to see whether responses on the Awareness Questionnaire questions 
predicted TI performance. To discover which questions (if any) on the Awareness 
Questionnaire best predicted TI performance, we fitted—for all subjects who met criteria 
and did the Inference Test at 20 minutes—a linear regression model with 20 minute score 
on all transitive pairs as the dependent variable, and, as the independent variables, 
awareness score, whether subjects had responded “yes” to each of the questions with 
objectively true answers, and whether subjects had answered “yes” to the question 
regarding whether they thought there was a hierarchy. The overall model was not 
statistically significant (F(6, 45)= 1.15, p=0.35) and explained only 13% of the variance 
in initial TI score. (R2= 0.13, adjusted R2= 0.017) The largest coefficient, by far, was for 
the question “Did you think that there was a hierarchy among the patterns seen in 
training? That is, did you think they could be ranked from ‘best’ to ‘worst’?” According 
to the multiple regression model, factoring out the impact of all answers to other 
questions, subjects who respond “yes” to this question achieved an initial overall TI score 
19 percentage points higher than those who did not. This coefficient is still not significant 
in the model (p=0.06). However, a t-test comparing subjects who answered “yes” to this 
question versus those that answered “no” yields a significant difference between these 
groups on initial TI score (answering Yes: 73% ± 4; answering No: 52% ± 5; t(50)= 2.59, 
p=0.01). Interestingly, the initial TI score among those answering “yes” is significantly 
above chance (t(38)=5.2, p<0.00001) but the initial TI score among those answering “no” 
is not (t(12)=0.33, p=0.74). The coefficient of the awareness score was not significant in 
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the model, but awareness score is highly related to whether subjects answered “yes” to 
the hierarchy question. Subjects who answered “yes” had a mean awareness score of 1.3 
± 0.2, whereas those answering “no” had a mean awareness score of 0.3 ± 0.1. The 
difference is highly significant (t(61.1)=5.4, p<0.0001). After removing the hierarchy 
question from the model, and scaling the awareness score scale to the same range of 
possible values as the other factors, the coefficient of the awareness score becomes the 
largest coefficient in the model (13.9 percentage points TI score per 3 awareness score 
points), but still not significant (p=0.25). A linear regression of initial TI scores against 
just awareness score is not significant (F(1,50)=2.0, p=0.16). Thus, only the question 
“Did you think that there was a hierarchy…” proved to be useful for predicting TI 
performance.  
Novel-item Test: We looked at whether the results of the Novel-item Test, 
administered immediately after the last Inference test, showed evidence of preference 
gradients. The mean slope of the regression lines produced for each subject by the Novel-
item Test, the 6-item NiT 
slopes (see Figure 4.4) at 
the 3 hour testing session, 
was a highly significant 8.8 
± 1.0 (t(63)= 9.0, 
p<0.0001; Figure 4.4). This 
positive slope indicates that 
typically subjects choose 
higher-ranked items over 
 
Figure 4.4: Mean 6-item NiT slope: mean rate at which 
subjects chose each hierarchy item over a novel item, 
with mean regression line. Item 1 = F and item 6 = A. 
(Error bars are s.e.m.) 
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novel items at a higher rate than lower-ranked items. A subject’s 6-item NiT slope was 
correlated with their performance on 1º pairs (r=0.46, p=0.0001), 2º pairs (r=0.48, 
p<0.0001), and overall TI performance (r=0.52, p<0.0001) at the same session. Thus, we 
see that subjects are overall more likely to choose higher-ranked items over lower-ranked 
items in the Novel-item Test, and their tendency to do so predicts their TI performance. 
Arguably the significantly positive novel-item slope could be driven entirely by the 
end items. Since items A and F are rewarded during training 100% and 0% of the time, 
subjects could have a strong tendency to choose A over the novel item, and anything else 
over F. This could drag the higher end up and the lower end down without there being a 
preference gradient across the middle, non-anchor members of the hierarchy. To rule this 
out we repeated these analyses using only items B through E of the novel-item test (the 4-
item NiT slopes). When we did this, the mean slope was somewhat flatter, 4.2 ± 1.5, but 
still significant (p=0.006). Strikingly, the correlations with 2º pair and 1º pair scores 
became larger (2º score: r=0.58, p<0.0001; 1º score: r=0.59, p<0.0001), with correlation 
with overall TI score even stronger (r=0.65, p<0.0001). (See figure 4.5 and Table 3.) 
Thus, the NiT slope over only the non-anchor hierarchy members more strongly predicts 
 Mean  (± 
s.e.m.) of 
slopes for all 
subjects 
Correlation 
with 1º 
score 
Correlation 
with 2º score 
Correlation with 
overall score 
Novel-item 
slope fitted 
to A-F 
8.8 ± 1.0 r=0.46 r=0.48 r=0.52 
Novel-item 
slope fitted 
to B-E 
4.2 ± 1.5 r=0.59 r=0.58 r=0.65 
Table 3: Novel-item slope correlations 
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transitive inference performance. It better predicts performance than the slope fitted to all 
points, suggesting that the 6-item slope is, indeed, sometimes spuriously driven by the 
anchor items. 
Then we asked whether evidence of a preference gradient on the Novel-item Test 
predicts symbolic distance effects (SDE)—a tendency to do better on 2º pairs than 1º 
pairs. The correlation between 4-item NiT slopes, and SDE as measured by the 
subtractive difference between 2º scores and 1º scores, was positive (r = 0.14) but not 
significant (p=0.27). Inspection of the scatter plot (see Figure 4.6) shows that the 
distribution is very non-linear: the magnitude of the 4-item NiT slope does not correlate 
with the magnitude of the disparity in 2º and 1º scores. However, we can sensibly ask a 
less daring question. Is there a relationship between being able to do 2º pairs at least as 
 
Figure 4.5: Overall scores on inference pairs vs. slopes of lines fitted to scores on 
items B through E of the Novel-item Test (both measured at the 3 hour testing 
session), color-coded by whether the subject answered “Yes” to the last question 
of the Awareness Questionnaire (“Did you think that there was a hierarchy…”). 
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well as 1º pairs (i.e. whether the 2º score – 1º score is at least 0), and having a positive 4-
item NiT slope? The results of a chi-square test are highly significant (!2(1, N=64)=11, 
p=0.0007), reflecting the fact that 72% of subjects fell into the upper right or lower left 
quadrant of the plot in Figure 4.6. Thus, in accordance with our expectations, evidence of 
a preference gradient on the Novel-item Test did strongly predict who would achieve at 
least as good a score on 2º pairs than 1º pairs. However, subjects with higher NiT slopes 
showed higher overall performance. 
These effects could have perhaps been because subjects who had, or developed, a 
preference gradient (as measured by the 4-item NiT slope) improved more on 2º pairs 
over the course of the afternoon. But, subjects overall did not change in their performance 
on 2º pairs between 20 minutes and 3 hours (improvement amongst all subjects: -0.8% ± 
 
Figure 4.6: Difference in 2º and 1º scores (positive indicates higher 2º 
performance) vs. slope of line fitted to scores on items B through E of the Novel-
item Test, evidence of a preference gradient; color-coded by whether the subject 
answered “Yes” to the last question of the Awareness Questionnaire (“Did you 
think that there was a hierarchy…”). 
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2.4; t(51), p=0.75). However this outcome could be the result of those subjects who had a 
preference gradient showing improvement, while other subjects got worse.  
To examine this possibility, we compared the improvement in 2º pairs in subjects 
having a positive 4-item NiT slope with those who did not. The difference in 
improvement was not significant (positive 4-item NiT slope: 0.7% ± 1.6; zero or negative 
4-item NiT slope: -2.5% ± 4.9; t(50)=0.66, p=0.51). Nor were these groups different in 
their change in 1º scores (positive 4-item NiT slope: 0.7% ± 2.0; zero or negative 4-item 
NiT slope: 4.8% ± 2.4; t(50)= 1.3, p=0.20). If we measure symbolic distance effects 
(SDE) as 2º score minus 1º score, subjects with positive 4-item NiT slopes did not change 
from 20 minutes to 3 hours in their SDE, whereas other subjects actually decreased in 
SDE—showed poorer performance on 2º pairs relative to 1º pairs at the later time—
although this difference was not significant (positive slope: 0.0 ± 2.3; zero or negative 
slope: -7.3 ± 5.2; t(50)=1.4; p=0.18). Thus, based on analyses in which we pool together 
all subjects (except those in the 3hr group from Experiment 1, for whom we cannot 
measure improvement), it does not appear that having a preference gradient—as shown 
on the Novel-item test at 3 hours—results in overall improvement on TI performance, nor 
does it produce relative improvement on 2º over 1º pairs.  
We asked whether sleep changed these results by re-running these analyses 
separately on the Nap and Wake groups of Experiment 2. In neither group did subjects 
improve, on average, on 2º pairs (mean improvement in Nap group: 1.6% ± 2.3; 
t(17)=0.68, p=0.51; in Wake group: -2.4% ± 2.0; t(16)= 1.2, p=0.26). In the Wake group, 
change in 2º pair score between the two testing sessions did not differ between subjects 
who did or did not have a positive 4-item NiT slope (positive slope: -4.2% ± 2.3; zero or 
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negative slope: 2.0% ± 3.7; t(15) = 1.4, p=0.17). However, improvement on 2º pairs did 
differ significantly between Nap subjects having a positive 4-item NiT slope and other 
Nap subjects (positive slope: 5.8% ± 3.3; zero or negative slope: -5.7 ± 3.7; t(18)=2.8, 
p=0.01). (See Figure 4.7) Improvement on 1º pairs did not differ significantly between 
subjects who did or did not have a positive 4-item NiT slope in either group (both 
p>=0.29). In the Wake group, the change in SDE (defined as 2º score minus 1º score) 
from 20 minutes to 3 hours did not differ between those having a positive 4-item NiT 
slope and the others (positive slope: -3.3% ± 4.5; zero or negative slope: -5.0% ± 8.4; 
t(15)=0.19, p=0.85); but, within the Nap group, change in SDE did differ significantly 
between these subsets (positive slope: 4.6 ± 2.3; zero or negative slope: -10.7 ± 3.5; 
 
Figure 4.7: Subjects in Experiment 2, Novel-item slope for non-anchor items vs. 
improvement in 2º scores, color-coded by group. Note that only in the Nap group 
(blue dots) is there a relationship between NiT slope and direction of change in 2º 
scores. 
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t(11)=2.0, p=0.0016). Change in SDE correlated with 4-item NiT slope in the Nap group 
(r=0.52, p=0.02) but not in the Wake group (r=0.20, p=0.45). (See Figure 4.8.) A 
repetition of Wake group analyses, in which we also include those subjects from 
Experiment 1 who did the Inference test twice, produces substantially the same results. 
(See Table 4.) Thus, subjects show opposite patterns of improvement, depending on 
whether they showed a preference gradient at the 3 hour testing session as measured by 
the 4-item NiT slope, only if they slept between testing sessions. However, regressing 4-
item NiT slope and change in SDE against time in each sleep stage reveals no significant 
coefficients (all p>=0.2).  
 
Figure 4.8: Subjects in Experiment 2, Novel-item slope for non-anchor items vs. 
change in SDE, color-coded by group. Only in the Nap group (blue dots) is there a 
relationship between NiT slope and change in SDE. 
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We asked to what extent performance on the Novel-item Test reflected subjects’ 
awareness that there was a hierarchy. A t-test revealed a significant difference between 
the mean slope on inner hierarchy members on the Novel-item test between subjects who 
answered “yes” or “no” on the hierarchy question on the Awareness Questionnaire (Yes: 
6.6 ± 1.8; No: -1.9 ± 2.2; t(40.4)=3.1, p=0.004). Thus it appears that when subjects can 
use a preference gradient, they are aware of it. Based on comparing the Nap and Wake 
groups of Experiment 2, whether subjects napped did not affect whether they answered 
Table 4: Changes in TI scores with and without sleep 
 Experiment 2 
Wake 
20min/3hr + 
20min*/3hr + 
Experiment 2 
Wake 
Experiment 
2 Nap 
Improvement in 2º scores from 
20 minutes to 3 hours different 
from 0? 
-2.4% ± 2.0; 
t(16)=-1.2, 
p=0.26 
-2.1% ± 3.6; 
t(32)=-0.59, 
p=0.56 
1.6% ± 2.3; 
t(17)=0.68, 
p=0.51 
Improvement in 2º scores with 
positive NiT slope 
-4.2% ± 2.3 -3.1% ± 1.8  5.8% ± 3.3 
Improvement in 2º scores with 
non-positive NiT slope 
2.0% ± 3.7 -1.2% ± 6.9 -5.7 ± 3.7 
t-test of 2º improvements 
comparing subsets based on NiT 
slope 
t(15) = -1.4, 
p=0.17 
t(31)=-0.27, 
p=0.79 
t(18)=2.8, 
p=0.01 
Improvement in 1º scores with 
positive NiT slope 
-0.8% ± 4.0 0.3% ± 3.1 1.3% ± 2.4 
Improvement in 1º scores with 
non-positive NiT slope 
7.0% ± 5.4 4.7% ± 3.4 5.0% ± 1.9 
t-test of 1º improvements 
comparing subsets based on NiT 
slope 
t(15)=-1.1, 
p=0.29 
t(31)=-0.95, 
p=0.35 
t(17)=-1.1, 
p=0.30 
Change in SDE with positive 
NiT slope 
-3.3% ± 4.5 -3.4% ± 3.5 4.6 ± 2.3 
Change in SDE with non-
positive NiT slope 
-5.0% ± 8.4 -5.9% ± 7.2 -10.7 ± 3.5 
t-test of changes in SDE 
comparing subsets based on NiT 
slope 
t(15)=0.19, 
p=0.85 
t(31)=0.30, 
p=0.77 
t(11)=2.0, 
p=0.0016 
Correlation of NiT slope and 
change in SDE 
R=0.20, 
p=0.45 
R=0.13, 
p=0.46 
R=0.52, 
p=0.02 
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“yes” to the hierarchy question (!2(1)=0; p=1), nor did it significantly affect their 
awareness score (Wake: 1.1 ± 0.3; Nap: 1.5 ± 0.3; t(34)= 1.1, p=0.29).  
Having found that both one question on the Awareness Questionnaire and the 4-
item NiT slope strongly predicted TI performance, we wondered if these factors mediated 
the difference in initial scores between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The mean 4-item 
NiT slope was significantly different between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
(Experiment 1: 0.6 ± 2.3; Experiment 2: 7.0 ± 1.8; t(62)= 2.2, p=0.03). We fitted a 
multiple regression model with initial overall TI score as the dependent variable, and 
experiment, 4-item NiT slope, and whether subjects answered “yes” to the hierarchy 
question as the independent variables. The model was highly significant (p<0.001), with 
one highly significant coefficient, for the 4-item NiT slope: subjects’ overall TI increased 
by 1.4 per unit increase in 4-item NiT slope. Neither the hierarchy question nor 
Experiment significantly predict TI performance in this model. If 4-item NiT slope is 
excluded from the model, the hierarchy question’s coefficient becomes marginally 
significant (p=0.044), but this is not surprising given that the hierarchy question so 
strongly predicts the 4-item NiT slope. With either 4-item NiT slope or the hierarchy 
question in the model, Experiment was not a significant factor (p>0.12). Thus, the 
difference in 20 minute scores between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 scores is 
explicable in terms of the difference in their preference gradients; although this leaves the 
differences in their preference gradients unexplained. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion 
 
Summary of Results: 
• Subjects do not improve on TI pairs over the course of 2.5 to 3 hours spent awake. 
• On average, subjects’ TI scores—both 1º and 2º—do not change over the course 
of a 90-minute afternoon nap. 
• Whether a subject has a positive 4-item NiT slope predicts the direction of change 
in their 2º scores over the course of a 90-minute afternoon nap; positive-slope subjects 
improve, while the others get worse on 2º pairs. The 4-item NiT slope predicts the change 
in a subject’s relative 2º versus 1º performance over the course of a nap. 
• Regardless of sleep, subjects with positive 4-item NiT slopes have, at the 3 hour 
testing session, equal or higher scores on 2º pairs compared to 1º pairs. 
• A subject’s 4-item NiT slope correlates highly with their TI scores on both 1º and 
2º pairs at the same testing session. 
• Subjects who answer “yes” to the question “Did you think there was a hierarchy 
among the patterns seen in training? That is, do you think they could be ranked from 
‘best’ to ‘worst’?” have higher Transitive Inference scores than subjects who answer 
“no”, and have higher 4-item NiT slopes. 
• Number of minutes in any sleep stage does not predict change in TI performance, 
change in relative 2º vs. 1º performance, or 4-item NiT slope. 
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• Subjects’ performance on Transitive Inference pairs at 3 hours was unaffected by 
whether they did an Inference Test at the 20 minute time point; thus doing repeated TI 
testing appears to not be problematic. 
Lack of improvement in TI over a short wake period: Our finding that subjects 
show, on average, no improvement on the Transitive Inference task at 3 hours in 
comparison to their performance after only 20 minutes, contrasts with Ellenbogen et al.’s 
finding that as a group, subjects tested on Transitive Inference pairs at least 12 hours after 
training performed much better than those tested after only 20 minutes. These results 
contrast, but they do not contradict: these results could be pieces of the same puzzle if the 
off-line process responsible for the apparent improvement in the Ellenbogen study 
requires between 3 and 12 hours to produce measurable effects. 
 The shorter period of off-line time before the final Inference Test is the most 
obvious difference between the Ellenbogen et al. study and the present study, but before 
concluding definitively that the shorter time period was responsible for the lack of 
improvement, other reasons for the differing result should be considered. In our version 
of the task, due to altering the criteria for exiting training, some subjects experienced 
more training blocks than they would have in the version of the task used in Ellenbogen 
et al.’s study. However, if the two subjects for which this was the case in the 20min/3hr 
group are excluded, the mean improvement in that group is still less than 5 percentage 
points for both 1º pairs and 2º pairs. In contrast, Ellenbogen et al. reported that subjects 
who did the inference test after 12 hours awake attained scores that were 23% better on 1º 
pairs, and 15% better on 2º pairs, on average, than subjects who did the inference test 
after 20 minutes. Mean improvement on 2º pairs in our 20min/3hr group was actually 
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negative, driven by one subject who obtained a perfect score on 2º pairs at 20 minutes 
and 0% at 3 hours. However, if we consider this subject an outlier and calculate the mean 
improvement on 2º pairs, it is still less than 3%. Theoretically improvement by a subset 
of subjects could be obscured into non-significance if other subjects are at ceiling at 20 
minutes, and therefore cannot improve. However, only one subject in our 20min/3hr 
group was at ceiling. 
Alternate explanations for apparent improvement in prior work: Ellenbogen et al. 
reported differences in TI ability in groups of subjects tested at different times relative to 
training. As these groups were supposed to be otherwise the same—random samplings of 
subjects from the same population—this implies that TI abilities of individual subjects 
evolved over time; i.e., had subjects in the 24 group been tested at 20 minutes, their TI 
scores would have been lower. However, as in all such studies, the sample is actually a 
convenience sample, not a random sample. It is ethically and logistically impossible to 
randomly select from the population and press the randomly-selected into service. Rather, 
one has to take the subjects who hear about the study, consider it worthwhile, and are 
willing to come to the lab on the schedule that the study requires; and hope that this set of 
subjects does not differ from the population in any important way. This introduces the 
possibility of bias, which could be significant, since the time requirements for different 
groups were different. One can only speculate, but perhaps the subjects who were willing 
to continue participation, once they were placed into groups which required more than 
one visit to the lab (the 12 and 24 hour groups), were the ones who took the task more 
seriously than those who showed up for the 20-minute protocol. Perhaps the 20-minute 
group over-represented subjects who had full-time employment (as this was the one 
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group with no 9 a.m. session). Perhaps this group over-represented subjects with lower 
executive functioning (as this was the one group that only had to come to the lab once, 
rather than two visits with the second visit strictly scheduled relative to the first). Given 
the diversity of strategies used by human subjects on this task, the possibility that such 
subtle factors could explain at least some difference between groups cannot be ruled out. 
The marked difference between 20 minute scores in subjects recruited for the two 
experiments in the current study clearly demonstrates that different cohorts perform 
differently on this task. Thus, the performance of Ellenbogen et al’s 20 minute group 
cannot be taken as a proxy for how their other subjects would have performed at 20 
minutes. The differences they report between 20 minutes and the later times may have 
been group differences. Further studies are required to determine how much within-
subject improvement occurs over 12 hours, and whether the within-subject improvement 
is sufficient to explain Ellenbogen et al’s between-group differences. 
The change in training exit criteria: A prerequisite to having within-subject 
improvement is that a sufficient number of subjects start off with a low baseline score 
when tested soon after training. Ellenbogen et al. (2007) ascribed the apparent 
development of TI ability in their subjects only after a delay, rather than immediately (as 
found in other studies), to unique features of their training procedure: specifically, first, 
the fact that they did not require an extremely high level of mastery of the premise pairs 
before the end of training; and secondly, the randomized order of the training trials.  
If... inference can take time to develop, then why have 
previous studies described the ability for inference 
immediately after training, without the need for such 
offline delays? Common among these past studies, and 
distinct from our paradigm, is that participants were trained 
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to ceiling levels on the premise pairs. (Ellenbogen et al., 
2007)  
To avoid training participants to ceiling levels on the premise pairs, training exited 
as soon as9 a participant met both these criteria on two consecutive blocks: an average 
score of at least 75% on the non-anchor pairs, and at least 50% on each non-anchor pair 
within each block. They justified ignoring participants’ performance on the anchor pairs 
in deciding when to exit training by pointing out that the subjects did not need to master 
the anchor pairs in order to respond correctly to the inference pairs, as these were all 
novel pairings between non-anchor items: “The middle pairs were used for criterion, 
rather than all pairs, because the middle pairs were the building blocks of inference (e.g., 
one must learn B>C and C>D to answer the inference question: B?D).” (Ellenbogen et 
al., 2007) 
However, these exit criteria are so lax that there is a high probability of meeting 
them entirely by chance before sufficient learning has occurred. If no learning has 
occurred, and thus the subject is responding randomly on each trial, the probability of 
responding correctly at least once on any one premise pair during a single block is (1-
0.52) = 0.75. The probability of responding correctly at least once on each of the three 
non-anchor pairs for two blocks in a row is 0.756 = 18%. To simultaneously achieve an 
overall score of 75% on non-anchor pairs, the subject must respond correctly both times a 
particular premise pair is presented within a block in at least 3 out of the 6 cases. There is 
a 0.25 probability of getting any one premise pair within one block correct both times, 
and a 0.5 probability of getting it correct exactly once; thus, over the course of 2 blocks, 
the probability of getting both instances of a premise pair within a block correct in n 
                                                
9 But not before completing at least 3 training blocks. 
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cases, and getting exactly one correct in the other (6-n) cases, is 6Cn * (0.25)n * (0.5)(6-n), 
where nCk symbolizes the number of ways of selecting k trials out of n to be successes. 
Thus, the probability of getting both correct in at least 3 cases (while getting one correct 
in the remaining cases) is: 
6C3 * (0.25)3 * (0.5)3 + 6C4 * (0.25)4 * (0.5)2 + 6C5 * (0.25)5 * (0.5)1 + 6C6 * (0.25)6   
This turns out to be only about 0.06.10 Thus a subject who is responding purely 
randomly has a 94% chance of continuing training after block 4. However the subject 
then has a chance of exiting training after block 5. This chance is not 6%, because 
performance on blocks 3+4 and performance on blocks 4+5 are not independent events; if 
a subjects is doing block 5, the probability of block 4 having had a 50% score on all three 
premise pairs is depleted, since all the cases in which blocks 3+4 meet criteria are 
removed. On blocks 5 and onwards, the chances of the previous block having had a 50% 
score on all three premise pairs, and 0, 1, 2, or 3 premise pairs at 100%, are reduced by 
approximately 2%, 11%, 30%, or 42%, respectively. Nonetheless, there is still about a 
4% chance of exiting by chance after random guessing after any block from 5 onwards. 
At this rate, after 10 blocks, only 72% of guessers would still be in training; and survival 
drops below 50% after only 19 blocks. Of course, if a subject has some partial knowledge 
leading to above chance on some inner premise pairs (despite still not having sufficient 
knowledge to pass the subsequent immediate test) the survival curve becomes even more 
dire. As a result of so many subjects being able to reach criteria purely by chance, many 
subjects do not pass the immediate test. Subjects without adequate performance on the 
                                                
10 The number of ways of choosing k ordered items out of n is n!/(n-k)!. This divided by 
k!, the number of ways to order k items, gives n!/(n-k)!k!, the number of ways of 
choosing k trials out of n to be successes. 
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premise pairs at the Immediate Test were excluded from both Ellenbogen et al.’s and our 
study, as unpublished data from Ellenbogen show that such subjects are (unsurprisingly) 
rarely above chance at any transitive pair at any time-point.  
At the start of this study, for the first 18 subjects, we used Ellenbogen’s criteria for 
exiting training, and subjects were given only one opportunity on the immediate test. Of 
these 18 subjects, 16 performed fewer than 30 (the maximum number) training trials; 
they had met the criteria for exiting training. However, 6 (37.5%) of these subjects did 
not pass the immediate test. Unpublished data show that of the subjects Ellenbogen et al. 
ran, about 40% also did not meet the inclusion criteria at Immediate Test, and were not 
included in the reported analyses. In retrospect this is not surprising, given the analysis 
above of the likelihood that a subject responding entirely at chance will exit training 
before reaching the maximum number of training blocks. Another possible factor is the 
fact that there may be some rapid forgetting of the premise pairs over the 5 minute rest 
period, and thus a subject who has an adequate grasp of the premise pairs at the end of 
training may not remember them as well at the immediate test; especially at a first 
attempt at the immediate test, as they may not realize at first that they will be tested, and 
thus have less motivation to remember.  
A paradigm that excludes 60% of people who sign up for the study from analysis 
would seem to produce results of dubious generality. Thus, we altered the task to avoid 
exiting training prematurely by chance, and to avoid having to exclude subjects who 
performed poorly on the immediate test. Examining the data from our first 18 subjects 
revealed that subjects who passed the immediate test usually had very high performance 
on the end-anchor premise pairs (pairs AB and EF) at the end of their training, whereas 
  
79 
subjects who did not pass the immediate test often had lower performance on the end-
anchor premise pairs at the end of training. This is consistent with the theory that many of 
the ones who failed the immediate test had exited training prematurely by chance. If one 
is at chance across all the premise pairs, but by luck gets each of the three internal 
premise pairs right at least once in each of two successive blocks, one has only a 32% 
chance of achieving the same on both the end-anchor pairs as well. Also having the end-
anchor pairs count towards the overall score, which must meet or exceed 75%, decreases 
the chance of exiting training prematurely as well. The task was also modified to resume 
training if the subject did not pass the immediate test, to deal with the (still possible) case 
that subjects would exit training by chance without adequate learning of the inner 
premise pairs, and the possibility that after training, some subjects may display rapid 
forgetting of the premise pairs.  
Altering the criteria for exiting training based on the assumption that subjects learn 
all the premise pairs at approximately the same rate—and thus, if they know the inner 
premise pairs adequately, will probably display high performance on the end-anchor pairs 
as well—runs the risk of over-training a subject whose learning of the end-anchor pairs 
trails that of the inner pairs. However, given all the prior work showing a serial position 
effect in performance on the premise pairs (i.e., the typically better performance on the 
end-anchor premise pairs compared to inner premise pairs), this seems quite unlikely. 
Given this, future studies should adopt these changes to the training criteria to avoid 
spurious training termination and over-exclusion of subjects. 
Validation of use of within-subject design: We do not believe that repeated 
exposure to the TI test could prevent improvement over time on this task. Thus, we 
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tracked TI ability within-subjects in the present study. This appears to have been 
validated in Experiment 1. Had there been a learning effect from performing the 
Inference Test at 20 minutes, we would expect to find some difference when comparing 
the performance at 3 hours of subjects who had done the Inference Test previously versus 
those who did not, given how closely the groups were matched on their training 
parameters; but there was no meaningful difference. Not that this completely rules out 
whether repeated exposure to the probe trials at the various time points interfered with the 
normal development in TI ability that might otherwise occur. It is conceivable that once 
subjects made choices on how to respond to probe trials in the first testing session, they 
perseverated in responding the same way at later sessions; in effect, learning what their 
own responses would be at the first testing session, and relying on that memory at later 
sessions. In a protocol in which subjects would not improve anyway, either because of 
too little off-line time or because the sleep opportunity was too short, the normal course 
of lack of improvement would be indistinguishable from this sort of perseveration, and 
we would see the same results as in Experiment 1. However, this possibility seems far-
fetched. Future work could rule this out as a reason for lack of improvement, if they do 
not find improvement similar to those found in earlier studies (Ellenbogen et al., 2007; 
Werchan & Gomez, 2013), by looking at whether an early exposure to the Inference Test 
makes subjects’ scores less malleable to later training that is designed to alter responses. 
Lack of improvement over the course of a nap: Although we did not see changes in 
TI performance over the course of 2.5 to 3 hours in Experiment 1, we hypothesized that 
adding a nap into that period of time could result in changes. Other tasks, in spite of 
showing off-line improvement over both wake and sleep in some circumstances, show 
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improvement only over sleep in other circumstances; for example, performance 
improvements on the MST are only apparent after sleep in non-musicians (Tucker et al., 
2016), and improvements on the SRTT are only apparent after sleep when subjects are 
aware of the sequence (Robertson et al., 2004). Although there are off-line processes that 
transform memories during wake, a function of sleep may be to make off-line processes 
more efficient by removing the need to simultaneously remain vigilant of the 
environment. By shortening the interval between training and test, we may have pushed 
the opportunity for off-line processes to occur below the threshold at which their effects 
would become apparent. We could have seen similar improvement on 1º and 2º pairs over 
a nap, if the difference between sleep and wake is a quantitative difference in the amount 
of opportunity for off-line processes, and thus a short amount of time were equivalent to a 
longer time awake; or we could have seen improvement preferentially for the 2º pairs, if 
sleep and wake support qualitatively difference off-line processes. However, on average, 
performance of subjects in our Nap group did not change between 20 minutes and 3 
hours on either 1º or 2º pairs.  
This is not because subjects failed to fall asleep. All non-ceiling Nap group subjects 
got at least 39 minutes of sleep, and at least 18 minutes of N2 sleep. This stage of sleep is 
characterized by the appearance of sleep spindles, which have been linked to 
improvement on many tasks. (Bang et al., 2014; Nishida & Walker, 2007) All but one of 
these subjects got at least 1 minute of N3 sleep, the deepest stage of sleep, and at least 2 
minutes of REM sleep, which we hypothesized might have a special role in the 
integration of disparate information. This is very little time compared to the amount of 
time usually spent in these stages every night; given this, it is curious that some studies 
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find a robust effect of naps on task performance, even naps as short as 6 minutes. (Lahl, 
Wispel, Willigens, & Pietrowsky, 2008) However, the finding that subjects who do not 
usually take naps do not show any benefit from a nap on a visual perception task 
(McDevitt, 2014) suggests that a full night of sleep, or nocturnal sleep, may be required 
for some forms of memory transformation. The TI task may be one of those cases, as our 
results are in striking contrast to Ellenbogen et al. (2007). When they allowed subjects a 
night of sleep after learning the premise pairs and before testing on the inference pairs, 
they found these subjects to be, as a group, 20 percentage points better on 1º pairs, and 39 
percentage points better on 2º pairs, than subjects tested only 20 minutes after training. 
However, the contrast between our over-sleep results and Ellenbogen et al.’s could be 
because our nap study was hampered in its ability to detect improvement by the fact that 
subjects were already at a high level of performance at baseline. 
Difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 baseline performance: Unlike 
in Experiment 1, quite a large number of subjects were at ceiling at 20 minutes in 
Experiment 2. The difference in 20 minute TI scores between experiments 1 and 2 was 
marginally significant (t(26.1)= 2.1, p=0.048). TI scores were not significantly different 
from chance at 20 minutes for Experiment 1 subjects, but were extremely significantly 
higher than chance in Experiment 2. This was problematic for this study, as we were less 
likely to see improvements in TI ability over sleep if many of the subjects were as good 
as they could get already before the nap opportunity. We analyzed those who were not at 
ceiling at 20 minutes to see if the effect of time that Ellenbogen et al. surmised perhaps 
existed amongst a subset of subjects who did not immediately develop TI. Even if we had 
found something there, it would have been a less interesting finding than Ellenbogen et 
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al.’s claim that subjects, in general, start near chance and that the mean improvement 
amongst all subjects is significant. 
Whether there was a reason for this difference between subjects’ performances in 
the two experiments, or whether (noting that the p-value for the disparity is 0.048) this is 
just the one out of 20 studies to be struck with a glitch of this size, is mysterious. Another 
difference in subjects’ performance between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is that the 
mean number of training blocks required to meet criteria and pass the immediate test was 
higher in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 (Experiment 1: 8.5 ± 0.7; Experiment 2: 
14.7 ± 1.7; t(47.3)= 3.4, p=0.001). However, the increased number of training blocks in 
Experiment 2 cannot be the confounding variable that mediates the relationship between 
experiment and initial TI score: in a multiple regression model predicting initial TI score 
based on number of training blocks and experiment, the coefficient for experiment is 
much closer to significance (p=0.053) than the coefficient for training block count 
(p=0.86). Likewise, a model predicting TI score based on percentage correct on the 
immediate test of premise pairs and experiment finds experiment to be a significant factor 
(p=0.03) but not the premise pair score (p=0.49). The mean score on the immediate test 
of premise pairs was not different between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (Experiment 
1: 93% ± 1; Experiment 2: 94% ± 1; t(61)= 0.25, p=0.80).  
The computerized task used to train subjects on the premise pairs was the same for 
both experiments (except for the changes made partway through Experiment 1, as noted 
above, which in practice affected only a small number of subjects). Instructions given to 
the subjects were the same. Subjects in Experiment 1 were run in late fall to winter, 
whereas subjects in Experiment 2 were run in the spring and summer. It is surprising to 
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see such a large seasonal effect on a cognitive task in human subjects, but this may have 
affected who was available amongst the student population, or factors such as how busy 
they were, or their stress level. The Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 protocols differed in 
minor ways, which we would not expect to affect subject performance: for example, 
Experiment 1 subjects had lunch after doing the task, whereas Experiment 2 subjects had 
lunch immediately before doing the task. All Experiment 2 subjects had EEG electrodes 
attached to their heads, a tedious process which often took about an hour, which then 
restricted their movements in a slightly inconvenient way. This, perhaps, set up different 
expectations amongst subjects regarding how seriously to take the computerized task. On 
the one hand, whereas it had to be clear to subjects in Experiment 1 that the main focus of 
the study was the computerized task, subjects in Experiment 2 might have thought that 
the acquisition of their brain wave signals was their core contribution to the study, and 
that the computerized task was incidental. For this reason subjects might have taken the 
task less seriously in Experiment 2, which could explain slower learning of the premise 
pairs. Also, subjects in Experiment 2 might have been annoyed by the electrode wires, 
thus reducing attention and motivation on the computerized task. On the other hand, 
subjects in Experiment 2 might have felt more invested and committed to the study on 
account of having to undergo the electrode placement, which perhaps resulted greater 
attention on the Inference Test and higher scores. All of this is completely speculative.  
Although subjects were recruited from the same universities, a factor that could 
have made a large difference biasing who signed up for the study is the wording of the 
advertisements used to recruit in each experiment. In Experiment 1 the ads made clear 
that subjects were free to do whatever they wanted between sessions, and most of them 
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took advantage of this time to study or do homework. The Experiment 2 ads made clear 
that they would be expected to either nap or watch television between sessions. Most 
subjects in Experiment 2 complied with this expectation; very few wanted to do their own 
schoolwork or reading. Thus, the subjects recruited in Experiment 2 may have been those 
amongst the student population with less pressing academic pressures. Whether a student 
is in a more or less demanding academic track is largely self-selected, thus we would 
expect to see differences between the population of subjects with more homework versus 
the population with less homework. Thus the motivation for not considering Experiment 
1 subjects the “Wake” group to compare with “Nap” subjects in Experiment 2: to do a 
valid comparison between the wake and nap condition, it was imperative to recruit Wake 
subjects in parallel with Nap subjects, run them at the same time, subject them to the 
same conditions, and indeed not randomize them into the Nap or Wake condition until 
the last possible moment. That subjects recruited at different times using different ads 
would differ somewhat is not surprising, but that the difference was quite so dramatic is 
surprising.  
Introduction of blocked training: Subjects in Experiment 2 were, on average, 
learning the premise pairs so slowly that an alarming number of the subjects were not 
managing to meet criteria and pass the immediate test before the 30th block of training. 
Again we were in the situation of excluding a high percentage of subjects, in spite of the 
changes to the exit criteria and repetitions of the immediate test discussed above. In 
previous work it had been observed that animals (and people) learn the premise pairs 
much more quickly if, rather than have trials of all the premise pairs mixed together 
randomly, subjects experience massed training on a single premise pair at a time. Rats 
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and pigeons are almost always trained using this “blocked order” training paradigm. 
Ellenbogen et al. avoided using “blocked order” training, because prior work had found 
that human subjects, after experiencing blocked order training, were more likely to be 
able to explicitly state that there was a hierarchy of stimuli, and to be at ceiling in their 
performance almost immediately. However, the blocked order training, as it had been 
done in previous studies, had another feature that was probably more responsible for the 
development of awareness of a hierarchy: In previous studies, the blocks of massed 
presentations of premise pairs were done in hierarchy order. That is, subjects would first 
experience many trials of A vs. B, followed by many trials of B vs. C, followed by C vs. 
D, and so on. (This is the “downward” order. Researchers have also done the reverse, 
“upward” order, i.e. teaching D vs. E first in a five-item series.) Perhaps it is this 
ordering that results in increased awareness, not the massed training. Learning 
overlapping premise pairs—premise pairs which feature a stimulus in common—in 
succession may trigger some subjects to observe and consciously reflect on the structure 
of the task. 
Thus, to make training easier for subjects who need it, we introduced a limited 
amount of a modified blocked order training: training which featured many repetitions of 
the same premise pair in succession; but unlike previous studies, when training moved to 
another premise pair, it was always a non-overlapping premise pair. Rather than 
experiencing premise pairs in the order AB, BC, CD, DE, EF, subjects would experience 
them in an order such as BC, DE, AB, EF, CD.  
Of the subjects who experienced this massed training on premise pairs, some were 
“aware” according to their responses on the Awareness Questionnaire and others were 
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not. Overall their awareness scores, and the rate at which they responded “yes” to the 
hierarchy question, seems to be a bit higher than other subjects in the same experiment, 
but too few subjects in the present study experienced the massed training to reliably test 
this statistically. Scores on 2º pairs at the 20 minutes may have been a bit higher with the 
blocked-order training, but again, more subjects would have to be run to test this. (See 
Table 5.) Future researchers could consider trying massed training trials in non-hierarchy 
as an alternative to the standard “downward” order blocked order training, as it may be 
easier for subjects to learn and yet not lead to any real increase in “awareness”. 
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Novel-item Test Results: We hypothesized that improvement on 2º pairs relative to 
1º pairs reflects an algorithmic change in how the task is done, from a coordination model 
towards the use of a preference gradient. To test this hypothesis, we need a direct 
measure of such a preference gradient, independent of subjects’ knowledge of 
relationships within the hierarchy. We hypothesized that the Novel-item Test, by 
comparing the rate at which subjects chose different items in the hierarchy over an item 
which could not be logically linked to the hierarchy, would reflect whether a preference 
 
 Subjects who 
experienced 
blocked-order 
training 
Subjects who 
experienced 
random-order 
training only 
Number of included subjects  4 32 
Percent who answered Yes to “Did you 
think any of the patterns were ALWAYS 
correct (no matter what the other pattern 
was)?” 
75% 75% 
Percent who answered Yes to “Did you 
think any of the patterns were ALWAYS 
incorrect (no matter what the other pattern 
was)?” 
25% 56% 
Percent who answered Yes to “In the test 
phase, did you notice any new combinations 
of patterns taken from those you saw before 
in the training phase?” 
100% 56% 
Percent who answered Yes to “In the test 
phase, did you notice any new patterns that 
you hadn’t seen in the training phase?” 
100% 63% 
Percent who answered Yes to “Did you 
think there was a hierarchy among the 
patterns seen in training? That is, do you 
think they could be ranked from ‘best’ to 
‘worst’?” 
100% 82% 
Mean awareness score 2.0 ± 0.7 1.2 ± 0.2 
Percent at ceiling at session 1 on TI pairs 25% 34% 
Mean score at 20 minutes on 1º pairs 68% ± 18 69% ± 5 
Mean score at 20 minutes on 2º pairs 88% ± 6 82% ± 5 
Table 5: Experiment 2, blocked order trained subjects vs. others. Comparison of 
awareness and performance characteristics subjects included in Experiment 2 who 
did, or did not, experience the blocked-order training.  
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gradient existed, and how strongly it influenced subjects’ choices. Thus we hypothesized 
that there would be some relationship between a subject’s Novel-item slope and their 
relative performance on 2º vs. 1º pairs. This proved to be true in a categorical way, in a 
non-parametric test: having any tendency to choose higher-ranked items at higher rates 
over the novel item (as evidenced by a 4-item NiT slope greater than 0) strongly 
predicted being able to do at least as well on 2º pairs as on 1º pairs. However the 
magnitude of the slope did not at all correlate with the magnitude of disparity between 2º 
score and 1º score. This correlation, amongst subjects who had a positive 4-item NiT 
slope and did at least as well on 2º pairs as 1º pairs, is not significant—and not even 
positive (r=-0.17, p=0.36). When the 4-item NiT slope is positive—given that the 4-item 
NiT slope linearly correlates with overall TI score—just how steep it is may be more of a 
function of how consistent or noisy a subject’s responses are. Thus, in the Novel-item 
Test, we have a tool for detecting the appearance of a preference gradient, but not for 
assessing how strong it is.  
That the Novel-item Test works is somewhat surprising, as we were concerned that 
it could be confounded by a tendency to favor familiar stimuli over novel stimuli, or vice 
versa. Other researchers have assumed that the values of stimuli start off at 0, and thus a 
novel stimulus would always lose out when compared to any stimulus encountered during 
TI training, each of which has acquired some association with reward (except perhaps the 
lowest-ranked item—although it may have acquired some value indirectly via its 
association with the next-to-lowest-ranked item, according to the Value Transfer Theory.) 
Thus it is interesting that subjects did choose the novel item fairly frequently. Overriding 
the association with reward, in some situations animals favor stimuli which are familiar, 
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for example as shown in the finding that college students rate people they have seen in 
class more frequently as more attractive; while in other situations the familiar item is 
disfavored, as in the novel object place recognition task. (Boyce et al., 2016) In the 
present study, we were concerned, after looking at the data from the first several subjects, 
that subjects were favoring the familiar stimuli, thus choosing the novel item too 
infrequently and obscuring any distinctions between items in the hierarchy. We could 
have added X>Y trials to the training, so that there was prior exposure to these stimuli. 
Ideally, one would train subjects on X>Y and Y>Z, then have subjects choose between Y 
and items from the longer hierarchy, so that the “novel” item would be one with some 
reward history (but not always rewarded). Out of concern for how long it would take to 
train subjects on even more premise pairs, rather than adding these pairs to training, we 
merely added instructions telling subjects, before they saw novel items, that a novel item 
would be the correct choice about half the time. It is unclear, however, what is the effect 
of attempting to consciously, deliberately override preferences shaped by reward 
conditioning. Rather than cleanly shifting the bias away from familiar items in an even 
way that would reveal preferences amongst hierarchy members, erratic attempts to apply 
this rule may have added noise to the Novel-item Test results.  
Gazes et al. (2012), in their experiment 2, attempted something similar to the 
Novel-item Test with monkeys trained on a 7-item series. In their experiment, monkeys 
chose between stimuli in the hierarchy and stimuli which had been partially rewarded in 
another task. Thus they avoided the difficulty of having stimuli that might have been 
disfavored due to being entirely novel. However, both the task in which monkeys 
encountered the “novel” stimuli, and the task in which they chose between hierarchy 
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members and “novel” stimuli, were somewhat different from the transitive inference 
premise pair training, which might have created the confound that preferences were being 
tested in a different context. They found that monkeys’ preferences amongst the stimuli, 
as assessed by their rate of choosing hierarchy stimuli over the “novel” items, did not 
correlate well with order within the hierarchy, according to the Spearman Rank Order 
correlation. However, this was arrived at by averaging together the responses of all the 
monkeys. They did not ask whether some monkeys’ responses to the hierarchy stimuli, 
when paired with novel items, corresponded better to the hierarchy order than others, and 
whether this had any relationship with differences in performances amongst the 
individual monkeys. It is possible that the monkeys differed in strategy, as did our human 
subjects, some of whom had perfect or near-perfect transitive performance in spite of 4-
item NiT slopes that were close to zero. Averaging together the preferences of a group of 
subjects may obscure a clear preference gradient that exists in a subset of the subjects. 
The monkeys had a gradient of responses that decreased from item A to item E, 
consistent with a preference gradient up to that point, but oddly high responses to items F 
and G, the two lowest-ranked items. The authors’ conclusion was that a preference 
gradient did not explain performance on the TI task. However, as the same set of stimuli 
was used for all monkeys, in the same hierarchy order, the possibility that the monkeys 
had idiosyncratic responses to certain stimuli, obscuring their preference gradient, cannot 
be ruled out.  
Lazereva & Wasserman (2012), using pigeons trained on a five item series, 
attempted to directly test the values of stimuli B and D in an entirely different way. They 
theorized that the higher the value of a stimulus to a pigeon, the longer the pigeon’s 
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reactions to the stimulus would show resistance to extinction—a continued positive 
response to the stimulus in the absence of reward—and, after extinction, the less the 
pigeon’s behavior would show resistance to reinforcement—a failure to resume positive 
reactions to the stimulus once reward was reinstated. Previous work had demonstrated 
that pigeons trained on a single discrimination pair (one rewarded stimulus, and one 
unrewarded stimulus, always presented together) would peck longer at the rewarded 
stimulus than at the unrewarded stimulus in extinction phases, during which there were 
no rewards; and resume pecking at the rewarded stimulus sooner than at the unrewarded 
stimulus in a reinforcement phase, in which all responses to stimuli were rewarded. 
However, comparing the pigeons’ responses to stimuli B and D from a series of 
overlapping discriminations revealed no such contrast. Lazereva and Wasserman then 
went on to alter the relative values of B and D by training the pigeons on many trials of D 
vs. E. After experiencing many more trials in which stimulus D was rewarded, the value 
of B was reduced relative to D according to resistance to extinction and resistance to 
reinforcement results—however accuracy on B vs. D was unchanged! Thus there is a 
dissociation between TI performance and the elemental value of the stimuli as measured 
by resistance trials. However, the preference gradient in use during TI trials may be 
specific to the context of the format of a TI trial; i.e. when aspects of the situation are 
changed (such as presenting two vs. one stimuli on the pecking screen) the pigeon may 
revert to relying on the reward frequencies experienced in similar trials, even if they were 
further in the past. 
Given the muddled state of evidence regarding whether performance on the TI task 
reflects a gradient of preference amongst the stimuli, it would be interesting, in future 
  
93 
work, to attempt a new version of the Novel-item Test that avoids the confounds in the 
current study (that of the novel items being entirely unfamiliar and never-rewarded) and 
in Lazereva & Wasserman’s (2012) study (that of trying to measure the preferences in a 
different task context). This could be done by adding X>Y and Y>Z to the TI training 
and using item Y in the Novel-item Test. As in turned out, the mean training time in 
Experiment 2 (in which all subjects were trained up to criteria on all the premise pairs, 
and would re-enter training if they failed the immediate test) was still under 13 minutes 
amongst subjects who were able to learn the task. Thus the burden of increased training 
time should not deter future studies from trying this, because the results we have so far 
with this initial version of the Novel-item Test are intriguing. 
As we hypothesized, having a positive Novel-item (NiT) slope—indicating a 
tendency to choose higher-ranked items more frequently than lower-ranked items over a 
novel item—is associated with the symbolic distance effect, higher performance on 2º 
pairs than 1º pairs. This association was significant in a categorical way: the !2 test shows 
that a positive 4-item NiT slope, regardless of how dramatic or how slight, predicts that a 
subject will perform at least as well on 2º pairs as 1º pairs. However it is not significant 
as a linear effect: NiT slopes of larger magnitude do not predict a wider spread between 
2º and 1º performance. This makes sense, as a preference gradient supports 1º 
performance as well. So a clearer, stronger preference gradient produces better 
performance on 2º pairs—but also 1º pairs, so the spread between them does not grow 
particularly. Indeed, the NiT slope is strongly correlated with both 1º pairs and 2º pairs, 
consistent with the preference gradient supporting performance of both. Nor is Figure 4.6 
linear in the lower left quadrant. Probably, a negative slope generally does not indicate a 
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reversed preference gradient, but occurs by chance, based on random responses in the 
absence of any preference differential between the items.   
What we did not accomplish in this study, due to time constraints, was to run 
enough subjects in Experiment 1 who experienced the Novel-item Test at 20 minutes to 
establish the validity of using repeated-measures with the Novel-item Test. It would be 
most interesting to see whether the NiT slope changes with time or sleep. But it is 
imaginable that prior exposure to the Novel-item Test could affect later performance on 
either test, for example because it could act as a series of extinction trials, or because 
prior exposure to the novel items would change subjects’ relative preferences to them in 
comparison to the hierarchy members. Ideally it would be best to run additional PR-
matched subjects in the 20min*/3hr and 20min/3hr groups, to compare their performance 
at the later testing session. The second testing session, rather than at 3 hours, should be 
conducted after a longer delay—even as long as 24 hours (at which point, according to 
Ellenbogen et al, subjects’ mastery of the premise pairs is not significantly lower than at 
20 minutes). If the off-line improvement that Ellenbogen et al. claim to have discovered 
is real, the question of whether prior exposure to the Novel-item Test disrupts that off-
line process is relevant; but we know from this study that 2.5 to 3 hours is too short for 
the off-line process to occur anyway. 
Most intriguingly, we saw differences in how subjects’ performance changed over 
sleep depending on whether their NiT slope was positive. Subsetting the Nap subjects by 
a threshold NiT slope, we find that average 2º scores went up in one subset and down in 
the other. This results in close to zero change on average overall amongst the whole 
group; thus not explaining Ellenbogen et al.’s finding that both their groups that slept 
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before testing had very high 2º scores overall. Perhaps their subjects were more likely to 
be those who would’ve had a positive NiT slope, had that test been done; or, less 
interestingly, the 12-hour sleep and 24-hour groups may have differed as a group from 
the 20-minute group, and were just better at the 2º pairs overall. Without having within-
subject measures, we can only speculate.  
Since we did not do the Novel-item Test at the 20 minute testing session, we do not 
know if NiT slopes would’ve changed over the nap. Did the subset of Nap subjects with 
positive NiT slopes at 3 hours, and generally positive improvements on 2º pairs, develop 
a preference gradient over the course of the nap, which we could’ve measured as an 
increase in NiT slope? Or did these subjects have a preference gradient from the start? 
Perhaps the effect of the nap was to bring subjects’ responses on the TI probes more in 
line with their existing preference gradient. Future work on this task should incorporate 
the use of the Novel-item Test at more than one point in time, to clarify this. 
Although we saw a distinct effect of taking a nap on the performance of subjects 
who had positive NiT scores, we did not find any correlations between time in particular 
sleep stages and this effect. The brain is in very different neuromodulatory states in 
different sleep stages—for example, having high acetylcholine levels during REM, but 
low during slow-wave sleep—which is thought to facilitate different types of memory 
processing. Thus we might expect to see sleep-dependent changes in performance occur 
or not depending on the type of sleep. It has been suggested that the mere initiation of a 
stage of sleep may produce a cognitive effect (Lahl et al., 2008), and thus it would be 
interesting to contrast subjects who did or did not get any time in each particular sleep 
stage. However, with a 90 minute nap, nearly all subjects in the Nap group got at least a 
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token amount of sleep in each stage, so these any/none contrasts for individual sleep 
stages are not possible with the current study’s data set.  
Awareness: Prior work with the Transitive Inference task in humans has established 
that subjects who are aware of the hierarchical relationship amongst the stimuli perform 
much better—often at ceiling—on transitive pairs (Smith & Squire, 2005). It has been 
reported that the “aware” subjects are more likely to rely on a “logic-based” strategy, 
whereas other subjects rely on “stimulus-driven” strategies; and that the “logic-based” 
strategy is dependent on declarative memory, which implies awareness (Libben & Titone, 
2008). Solomon et al. (2015) put forth the view that TI performance can be supported by 
conjunctive encoding in the hippocampus, permitting flexible re-combination of the 
premise pairs (presumably this is the “logic-based” strategy), or by “associative strength-
based reinforcement histories of stimuli”, mediated by the striatum (the reward system), 
and that these strategies are competitive. Ellenbogen et al. (2007) reported that 
improvement on TI over time was not accompanied by an increase in subjects’ 
confidence in their responses; they interpreted this to mean that whatever process occurs 
over time, it does not involve increasing use of a logic-based strategy, which subjects 
would presumably be aware of (and thus lead to confidence). Based on these findings, 
Werchan & Gomez (2013) hypothesized that the off-line, delayed development of TI 
ability that they were interested in was not supported by the logic-based strategy 
associated with awareness, and thus they excluded subjects who displayed high 
awareness in a debriefing. 
Based on this, we hypothesized that we would find two different patterns of results 
if we divided subjects into two subsets, depending on the degree of “awareness” they 
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displayed on the Awareness Questionnaire: highly aware subjects would be near ceiling 
on transitive pairs, give highly accurate responses to the questions on the Awareness 
Questionnaire, and not improve over time; and non-aware subjects would not be at 
ceiling, but might show changes in performance over time due to an off-line process 
acting on their preference gradient. As Ellenbogen et al.’s finding of no changes in 
confidence over time seemed to indicate that off-line delayed processes were not leading 
to insight, we assumed that the answers on the Awareness Questionnaire would reflect 
the state of subjects’ awareness throughout the study, even though it was administered 
only at the end (and subjects cannot be relied on to accurately remember their prior state 
of knowledge).  
Our findings up-end that picture to some extent. As expected, subjects who 
answered “yes” to the question “Did you think there was a hierarchy among the patterns 
seen in training? That is, do you think they could be ranked from ‘best’ to ‘worst’?” 
performed significantly better on transitive pairs than subjects who answered “no”. 
However, results were inconsistent with the view that these subjects were using a logic-
based strategy, and that an “associative strength-based” strategy was competitive to this 
strategy. Subjects who answered “yes”, overwhelmingly, also had stronger preference 
gradients, as shown on the Novel-item Test. Furthermore, subjects who answered “yes” 
(and who, before being prompted with the word “hierarchy”, gave free-text answers that 
seemed consistent with awareness of the hierarchy) frequently failed to correctly answer 
yes-no questions about the task, suggesting insufficient declarative memory about the 
task to support an explicit logic-based strategy. Thus, an answer of “yes” seemed to 
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indicate, not that they were using a logic-based strategy, but that they were using a 
preference gradient strategy that they were aware of.  
Ideally we should have asked a follow-up question to the “hierarchy” question: of 
subjects who answered “yes”, we should have asked “Must a higher-ranked item 
ALWAYS win if paired with a lower-ranked item?” As researchers on the Transitive 
Inference task, we tend to think of the relationship A>B as one with mathematical 
certainty: if A is taller than B and B is taller than C, then A must, inevitably, be taller 
than C. However the strategy that subjects use when not told what the relationship is 
could be one that supports other types of rankings. For example, given three baseball 
teams, if the Yankees are better than the Twins and the Twins are better than the Cubs, 
must the Yankees always beat the Cubs? Clearly, no. Hopefully these results lead to a re-
thinking of what role “awareness” plays in assessing whether human subjects are using a 
logic-based strategy. 
Exploring the time course of performance on this task can shed light on transitive 
inference abilities in more ecologically relevant circumstances. Transitive inference 
experiments have in the past been designed to maximize learning by repeating training 
trials until a very high level of mastery is displayed, and organizing training trials into 
repetitive blocks. However, animals evolved to cope with environments which were not 
designed to optimize learning. For any animal, the greatest survival value would be to 
make the maximal use of whatever minimal clues the environment provides. This may 
require using off-line periods and sleep to explore and re-combine waking experiences. 
An understanding of how the brain’s representation of information changes over time 
could contribute to our understanding of why animals need to sleep.
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